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PRACTICAL ISSUES WHEN APPRAISING PRIVATELY HELD BUSINESSES
I.

Factors to Consider Before Engagement of a Valuation Expert
A.

Use of Experts to Establish a Taxpayer's Position of Value

1.
The complexity of the facts relevant to the resolution of the
controlling issues in a tax controversy frequently requires counsel's employment of one
or more experts in various factual areas to assist in counsel's assimilation of the facts
within the taxpayer's theory of the case, evaluate critically the Internal Revenue
Service's case-in-chief and to provide expert testimony at trial. Factual areas for which
an expert's assistance may be beneficial to counsel include:
a.

Property appraisals.

b.

Industry practices and conditions.

c.

Arm's-length nature of intercompany price, royalty or service
fee.

d.

Appropriateness or logic of an accounting
method.

e.

Relative significance of intangibles in generating a party's
income.

f.

Labor productivity.

g.

Financial and cost accounting.

h.

Patent, securities or other domestic legal
areas.

i.

Foreign law.

2.
Experts, who are retained in connection with a potential tax
controversy (regardless of the stage of the controversy), always should be retained
formally by legal counsel (i.e., the taxpayer's General Counsel or preferably by outside
tax litigation counsel) to ensure maximum protection for the expert's work product and
correspondence under the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine during
audit and pretrial discovery.
3.
Before any employment relationship is formalized, the attorney
should undertake to perform a comprehensive conflict check to make sure there are no

conflicts of interest between the expert and his or her firm and the taxpayer. Not only is
the failure to determine a conflict embarrassing and costly, it can result in the ultimate
disqualification of the expert. For example, in International Business Machines v.
United States, 2000 TNT 146-17 (Fed. Cl. 7/18/00), an expert from a French law firm
was disqualified from testifying on behalf of IBM because the Justice Department was
using an expert from the same law firm in the same litigation. The French law firm, an
affiliate of Ernst & Young LLP, had failed to identify both the pre-existing relationship of
IBM with Ernst & Young LLP, the accounting firm, and the law firm's representation of
both sides in the dispute. The court found the creation of a so-called "Chinese Wall" an
inadequate solution to the conflicts problem.
4.
The expert's employment relationship should be documented by a
formal retention letter executed by counsel and the expert. Careful consideration
should be given to whether the expert's engagement will be conducted under either or
both the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine. Although an
engagement with attorney-client privilege may yield better protection, broad waiver rules
apply if the expert later becomes a "testifying expert." Even in the case of work product,
use of an expert in a testifying role will subject the expert's related files (including
conversations with counsel) to disclosure.
5.
Care should be exercised in disclosing facts to, and exchanging
correspondence with, the expert. Experts, their work product, and communications with
counsel and the client, can be subject to extensive pretrial discovery both during the
audit and in the Tax Court. As a general rule, all materials or communications disclosed
to an expert should be assumed to be subject to IRS discovery.
6.
Before retaining an expert, the taxpayer and tax counsel should
determine the precise scope of the expert's assignment and the intended use of the
expert (eq., testifying, nontestifying expert). This determination directly influences the
selection of a particular expert, the specific facts and documents provided to the expert
and the effective utilization of the expert in the case. If it is intended that the expert will
testify at a trial, precautions should be undertaken to ensure that the expert's evidence
will be relevant and reliable as outlined by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999). For a fuller discussion of the Kumho Tire opinion, see
Littleton, Kumho Tire-SupremeCourt Dramatically Changes the Rules on Experts, and
Cavanagh, Kumho Tire-Decision Extends Daubert Approach to All Expert Testimony,
New York State Bar Journal, Vol. 71, No. 6 (July/August 1999).
7.
An expert also can be used to provide opinion to an examination
agent or an Appeals Office during the IRS's administrative proceedings. There are
several important caveats to such use of the expert: since the expert's opinion has been
disclosed, the IRS may immediately request the expert's written report, work papers and
correspondence on the ground that any privileges have been waived by offering the
expert's opinion to the IRS. Materials or assertions revealed by the expert might be

used to impeach his opinion offered at trial or as admissions against the taxpayer.
Thus, the expert's opinion should never be offered at the Examination or Appeals
level unless counsel is relatively certain that the client's trial position will remain
substantially unchanged.
The IRS may attempt to use the taxpayer's expert opinion in its own
8.
case-in-chief if the taxpayer fails to offer the expert's opinion at trial. The IRS
increasingly is involving its trial counsel during the administrative proceedings of large
cases. The IRS will generally wish to interview or depose any expert used during the
audit or at the Appeals level. Thus, the taxpayer's expert opinion revealed at these
administrative levels may receive a substantial level of critical scrutiny even prior to the
case being docketed in court.
An expert also can be deployed productively in a nontestifying role
9.
as an advisor to counsel. If highly technical expert evidence is required for litigation,
counsel might not be competent to prepare the testifying expert without the assistance
of the testifying expert himself or another expert. If counsel relies exclusively on the
testifying expert for such preparation, there is a substantial risk that information
disclosed to him will become discoverable by the opponent. One way to avoid such a
trap is to use a nontestifying expert as an adviser to counsel in planning and developing
the testifying expert a testimony.
10.
following areas:

B.

A nontestifying expert also can provide invaluable assistance in the
a.

helping to anticipate the IRS's position and
developing defenses to those positions;

b.

assisting in discovery;

c.

assisting in the interrogation of opposing
experts;

d.

assisting in stipulations; and

e.

marshaling facts and technical resources in the
expert's areas of expertise.

The Business Valuation Professional Environment
1.

The Appraisal Foundation and Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice

2.

a.

The Appraisal Foundation, a non-profit organization formed
by appraisal trade associations, adopted the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP") on
January 30, 1989.

b.

The Appraisal Foundation has two boards,
Appraiser Qualifications Board ("AQB") and the
Appraisal Standards Board ("ASB").
(i)

The purpose of the AQB is to develop
and promote meaningful criteria by
which appraiser competence can be
measured.

(ii)

The purpose of the ASB is to set
standards of appraisal.

Guidance of USPAP
a.

USPAP is promulgated annually.

b.

The ASB promulgates the "Standards". The ASB also
promulgates Statements on Appraisal Standards that clarify,
interpret, explain or elaborate on the Standards, and have
the same weight as Standards. The ASB also issues
Advisory Opinions to offer guidance to appraisers, but which
do not have the weight of the Standards or Statements on
Appraisal Standards.

c.

USPAP also contains a Definitions Section, a Glossary, a
Preamble and five rules pertaining to ethics, competency,
departure, jurisdictional exception and supplemental
standards.

d.

There are no licensure requirements in most states for
business appraisers and, accordingly, no requirement that
USPAP be followed. The IRS does not require that
appraisers follow USPAP. However, certain appraisal
organizations, such as the American Society of Appraisers,
do require their members to follow USPAP in business
valuation appraisal assignments.

e.

In 1989, FIRREA required that real estate appraisals used in
conjunction with federally related transactions be performed
in accordance with USPAP.

3.

C.

USPAP's Ten Standards
a.

Standards 1 through 8 deal with 1) Real Property Appraisal Development, 2) Real Property Appraisal - Reporting, 3)
Appraisal Review - Development And Reporting, 4) Real
Property Appraisal Consulting - Development, 5) Real Property
Appraisal Consulting - Reporting, 6) Mass Appraisal Development And Reporting, 7) Personal Property Appraisal Development and 8) Personal Property Appraisal - Reporting.

b.

Standard 9 pertains to the development of a business or
intangible asset appraisal. Standards Rule 9-4 requires
appraisers to use all valuation approaches that apply to the
engagement and to examine a list of valuation factors that
are similar, but not identical, to the "eight factors" set forth in
Rev. Rul. 59-60.

c.

Standard 10 covers the reporting of a business or intangible
asset appraisal. Two reporting options are available;
Appraisal Report or Restricted Use Appraisal Report. The
intended use of the appraisal when a Restricted Use
Appraisal Report is issued must be for client use only.
Standard 10 contains four Standards Rules.

The International Valuation Standards Committee (IVSC)
a. The objective of the IVSC is to formulate and publish, in the
public interest, valuation Standards and procedural guidance for
the valuation of assets for use in financial statements, and to
promote their worldwide acceptance and observance. The
second objective is to harmonize Standards among the world's
states, and to make disclosures of differences in standards
statements and/or applications of Standards as they occur. It is
a particular goal of IVSC that international valuation Standards
be recognized in statements of international accounting and
other reporting standards, and that Valuers recognize what is
needed from them under the standards of other professional
disciplines.

b. For International Valuation Guidance Note No. 6 pertaining to
business valuations - See Appendix A. Guidance Note 6
Business Valuation is published within the 6th edition of
International Valuation Standards (2003). The Guidance Note
has been reproduced with the permission of the International
Valuation Standards Committee (IVSC) who hold the copyright.
The IVSC cautions that the individual Standards, Applications
and Guidance Notes are a component part of the entirety of 6th
edition of the International Valuation Standards (2003). The
reading of the entire document is advised for the understanding
and use of the International Valuation Standards. The approved
text of the 6th edition of International Valuation Standards
(2003) is that published by the IVSC in the English language.
For information on obtaining a copy, please visit the IVSC web
site, http://www.ivsc.org; email the IVSC on ivsc@ivsc.org; or
fax +44 1442 879306.
D.

Professional Business Appraisal Organizations
1.

American Society of Appraisers

The ASA is a multi-appraiser discipline association that provides
accreditation in several appraisal subspecialties (business valuation, gems and jewelry,
machinery and technical specialties, personal property, real property and appraisal
review) at two different experience levels: Associate Member ("AM") and Accredited
Senior Appraiser ("ASA"). The AM credential requires a college degree, two years of
appraisal experience, complete four courses and a qualifying exam, together with peer
review of an appraisal report prepared by the AM candidate. The ASA credential
requires the candidate to become AM credentialed and obtain an additional three years
of appraisal experience.
2.

Institute of Business Appraisers

The Institute of Business Appraisers offers four primary
designations: Certified Business Appraiser ("CBA"), Master Certified Business
Appraiser ("MCBA"), Fellow of the Institute of Business Appraisers ("FIBA"), and
Business Valuation Accredited for Litigation ("BVAL"). The CBA requires a four-year
college degree, completion of IBA coursework or five years of full-time active
experience as a business appraiser, successful completion of an examination, and
successful review of two business appraisal reports.

3.

National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts

The NACVA offers three designations: Certified Valuation Analyst
("CVA"), Accredited Valuation Analyst ("AVA"), and Certified Forensic Financial Analyst
("CFFA"). The CVA requires a valid and unrevoked CPA license, completion of a five
day training program and successful completion of an examination. The AVA does not
require a CPA license but does require at least two years of business valuation
experience, completion of ten or more business valuation engagements in which the
candidate's involvement is referenced in the report, completion of a five day course, and
successful completion of an examination.
4.

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

The AICPA offers the Accredited in Business Valuation ("ABV")
designation only to members of the AICPA who hold CPA licenses. The ABV requires
the passage of an exam and performance of significant services in at least ten
valuations.
5.

Association for Investment Management and Research

The AIMR is not an appraisal association; instead it is an
organization of investment practitioners and educators. The AIMR offers the Chartered
Financial Analyst designation ("CFA"). CFA holders must pass a three-part examination
over a three-year period, which is widely recognized to be far more rigorous than any of
the exams of the various appraisal associations, and adhere to the AIMR standards and
regulations. The CFA curriculum and exam covers the analysis of equity and fixed
income securities, derivatives, portfolio management, quantitative methods, ethics and
professional standards, accounting and financial statement analysis, corporate finance
and economics.
II.

Selecting a Valuation Expert
A.

Locating the Expert

1.
qualified, expert?

Do you need a nationally recognized expert or a local, well

2.
A national expert may be more appropriate if the case involves a
large amount in dispute, issues are complex, numerous experts (different specialties)
may be needed, etc. Sometimes the level of specialty cannot be found among local
experts, i.e., industry, knowledge.
3.
Locating the appropriate expert may come from a variety of
sources. For example, leads from litigators, by line of expertise, from similar cases,

review of Tax Court valuation cases, universities, trade associations and industry leads,
etc.
B.

C.

Selection Criteria for Experts
1.

Appropriate qualifications;

2.

Type of expert;

3.

Use of De Facto experts;

4.

Familiarity with recent developments;

5.

Communications ability;

6.

Objectivity;

7.

Experts with baggage.

Retaining the Expert

Always use a written engagement agreement with the expert
1.
witness that contains the essential terms of employment, together with appropriate
confidentiality and control provisions.
2.

Keep in mind the following points:
a.

Never agree to pay an expert witness contingent fees.

b.

The attorney, not the client, should directly execute
the expert witness engagement agreement as the
retaining party, so that the attorney-client privilege
and the attorney work product privilege can be
preserved.

c.

The agreement should provide that all information,
data, records, etc., provided to the expert or gathered
by the expert will remain confidential and may not be
disclosed to third parties other than the attorney in the
absence of the attorney's instructions.

d.

The agreement should specify that all information and
work product of the expert will remain the exclusive
property of the retaining attorney, and all will be
surrendered upon request of the attorney and/or

delivered to the attorney at the conclusion of the
engagement.

Ill.

e.

The agreement should specify that the attorney will be
advised immediately in the event the expert receives
any summons, subpoena, or other legal process
compelling production of any information or work
product.

f.

The agreement should provide that the expert is
engaged solely to provide truthful testimony regarding
the issues, and should provide that the expert is to act
independently of counsel.

g.

The agreement should contain various
representations from the expert to the effect that no
legal or ethical conflicts of interest exist that would
impair the expert's independence and objectivity
under the engagement.

Accountant's and Attorney's Role in Assisting the Appraiser
A.

General Data

1.
To assist an appraiser in completing an appraisal, or if the
practitioner is attempting to prepare an informal appraisal of a business (whether a
closely held corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship), of interest are the following
types of information:
a.

audited financial statements and copies of the federal and
state income tax returns for the previous 3 to 5 years;

b.

a list of subsidiaries or affiliated companies;

c.

the fixed asset list and depreciation schedule;

d.

copies of all contracts, including leases and stock purchase
or other types of purchase agreements;

e.

compensation schedule of principals;

f.

schedule of insurance in force including life
insurance;

g.

budgets or projections;

h.

marketing literature;
information concerning tangible assets such as patents or
trademarks;

j.

k.

2.

IV.

any other appraisals or consulting reports relating to the
assets of the business.
information relating to commitments to pension, profit sharing,
stock option or other qualified plans;

1.

copies of business and personal loan applications made in
the preceding several years; and

m.

information concerning contingent or off balance sheet
assets or liabilities, such as pending lawsuits or warranty
claims.

The exact nature and the amount of general data necessary in any
appraisal are matters of judgment.

The Basics
A.

Gettinq the Court to Believe in Your Expert Witness' Opinion as to
Value

1.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify
in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
The court is not bound by the opinion of any expert nor must it
2.
accept an expert's testimony. Trial judges have substantial discretion and considerable
leeway to determine how to evaluate relevance and reliability and to make a
determination whether to admit the expert evidence.
3.
Expert evidence is weighed in light of the demonstrated
qualifications of the experts and all other relevant evidence. All types of expert
evidence are subject to the relevance and reliability "gatekeeping function" that the
Supreme Court articulated in Daubert with respect to scientific evidence. Kumho Tire,
supra. See Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38 (1987). The court can adopt
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certain portions of an expert's testimony and reject other portions of the testimony.
Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1991).
However, the court may not substitute its best judgment for that of
4.
the experts without spelling out its reasoning for doing so, i.e., it may not "leap to a
figure intermediate between petitioner's and the Commissioners." Leonard Pipeline
Contractors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 142 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998).
It is critical to the persuasive presentation of an expert's opinion to
5.
a court to ensure the expert's credibility. See Eli Lily & Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.
996, 1147 (1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988), in which
the Tax Court, "after observing [the expert's] demeanor on the witness stand,. .. [chose]
substantially [to] discount his report and testimony." See also Seagate Tech. v.
Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149, 272 (1994); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C.
226, 371 (1991), Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967).
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases
6.
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before
the hearing. If the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, they need not be
admissible into evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 703. Since Federal Rules of Evidence 703
permits an expert to base testimony on facts made known to the expert before trial and
which might not be admissible into evidence, Federal Rules of Evidence 703 is, in
essence, an exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, inadmissible hearsay can be
incorporated into the record through an expert.
Generally, testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
7.
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact. Fed. R. Evid. 704. An expert may testify in terms of an
opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may be required,
however, to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination at trial. Fed. R.
Evid. 705. In most cases, however, it is advantageous to present the facts or data to
the Court to further the credibility of the expert's conclusions based thereon.
B.

Involvement of the Internal Revenue Service in Valuation
Disputes

Incurring the expense of obtaining an appraisal in order to comply
1.
with the regulations only to have the IRS redetermine the value is a frustrating
experience. This problem may be avoided if the appraiser completely sets forth all
factors affecting value and clearly expresses valid reasons for the relative weight given
each factor in reaching a conclusion, although the IRS may differ with the taxpayer's
appraiser based only upon the informal opinions of its experts. At this point, it is

important to insist that the IRS also secure a formal appraisal, which should
considerably shorten settlement negotiations.
2.
It is not unusual for the IRS' experts to enter a case shortly before
the date of trial, which can be as much as five or six years after the valuation date.
Generally speaking, when this occurs, the IRS' experts may be completely unfamiliar
with the property until they are asked in to appraise it. Even after they familiarize
themselves with all of the relevant factors, they are frequently at a disadvantage where
there have been substantial physical changes in the property, the market, or in the
geographical area in which it is located. For example, in Mast v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 1989-438 (1989), the Tax Court disregarded the IRS expert's appraisal of
photographic equipment donated to charity. The expert was retained shortly before trial
and did not initially examine the property. The court also awarded the taxpayer litigation
costs under I.R.C. § 7430, since the IRS originally had valued the property at zero
(despite an appraisal in excess of $1 million by another expert the IRS hired but did not
call at trial), had ample time to retain an expert before trial, and refused to compromise
on the valuation. See also Clemens v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1992-436 (1992)
(court evaluated the appraisals of two experts and made its own determination of value
by adjusting petitioner's appraisal).
3.
The taxpayer's experts should normally be local appraisers,
thoroughly familiar with the property, so that they will be in a position to state the nature
of the changes and to attach a value to them. The important point to be remembered is
that the local experts can, by pointing out factors not specifically mentioned by the IRS'
experts, cast doubts upon the IRS' experts' testimony or even upon their qualifications.
4.
When consulting with experts for purposes of preparing the
taxpayer's appraisal, it is important to document not only the expert's opinions, but the
present status of the property, the area in which it is located, the present zoning, and
the possibility of changes in zoning. This information will, of course, be useful to a
professional appraiser after he or she is brought into the case.
5.
For example, in Sherman v. U.S., 79-1 USTC 13,288 (E.D. Va.
1979), the court accepted the valuation of the taxpayer's experts, who had a more
intimate knowledge of the conditions in the market in the year of the decedent's death
than did the government's expert, who appraised the real estate six years after the
decedent's death. The taxpayer's experts were aware of a depressant factor on the real
estate market resulting from a sewer moratorium imposed by the county at the time of
the decedent's death, the limited frontage of the property requiring the construction of
service roads before any development could take place, and the unknown factor of
whether the property was really suitable for development in conjunction with the
adjacent property. Similarly, in Brown Est. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1962-249
(1962), the court accepted the testimony of the taxpayer's expert where the
government's expert had not seen the property until several years after the valuation
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date, and was imprecise as to the effect to be given to the value of the substantial
improvements which had been made since the valuation date.
6.
A distinction should be observed between a decision of a court to
accept or not accept the appraisal, eq., the court reaches its own decision based upon
an analysis of the appraisals submitted by the parties, and the court's decision to accept
or not accept the person as a qualified expert.
7.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 relates to expert witnesses and their
use in civil litigation in the federal courts. Rule 702 is made applicable in Tax Court
litigation by Tax Court Rule 143. In McCampbell Est. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
1991-141 (1991), the Tax Court held that employees of the bank serving as executor
did not qualify, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, as experts for presenting opinions
on the valuation of real estate, and that they did not have any special knowledge that
would justify their testimony as lay witness opinion testimony.
8.
In Knoell Est. v. U.S., 236 F. Supp. 299 (W. D. Pa. 1964), the court
held that the IRS' witness did not qualify as an expert witness because he did not have
actual personal knowledge of the facts affecting the land at the valuation date. In the
interval between the valuation date and the date on which the IRS' expert examined the
property, there were substantial and extensive changes to the property, thus making it
impossible for him to evaluate the property as of the proper date. And in Dougherty Est.
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1990-274 (1990), the Tax Court gave little weight to one
of the taxpayer's appraisers because he was the executor and the decedent's son. The
opinion of another appraiser was also discounted because he lacked experience in the
geographic area the realty was located in and had extensive business dealings with the
decedent.
9.
A professional appraiser may be assessed a penalty under I.R.C. §
6701(a) (up to $1,000 per document) for aiding or assisting in the preparation or
presentation of an appraisal where there is an understatement of tax liability. The
penalty is applicable to a person who knows or has reason to believe that the facts
relating to an understatement of tax liability are false.
10.
In Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, the IRS outlined the types
of information which are to be contained in a competent appraisal of all types of
noncash property for which an appraisal is required, e.., real property, tangible or
intangible personal property, and securities. The procedure is also appropriate for
unique properties such as art objects, literary manuscripts, and antiques (among
others), with respect to which the determination of value is often more difficult. Although
this Revenue Procedure is applicable principally for income tax purposes, it is also
pertinent for estate and gift tax purposes. Although the example involved in the
Revenue Procedure involved artwork, the Rev. Proc. states that similar information
should be provided for other types of property. The required information contained in
the appraisal is as follows:

*o a summary of the appraiser's qualifications;
o. a statement of the value and the appraiser's definition of the
value he has obtained;
o. the bases upon which the appraisal was made, including any
restrictions, understandings, or covenants limiting the use or
disposition of the property;
o:° the valuation date of the property; and
o. the signature of the appraiser and the date the appraisal was
made.
Where art objects are concerned, and particularly paintings, the
11.
appraisal should include the following elements:
o:o a complete description of the object, indicating the size, the
subject matter, the medium, the name of the artist, the
approximate date the work was painted, and the interest
transferred;
,* the cost, date and manner of acquisition;
o:o a history of the item, including proof of authenticity, such as a
certificate of authentication if such exists;
o:o a photograph of sufficient size and quality to identify the subject
matter, preferably a ten by twelve inch or larger print;
o. a statement of the factors upon which the appraisal was based,
such as sales of other works by the same artist, particularly on
or around the valuation date;
o. quoted prices and dealers' catalogues of the artist's work or of
other comparable artists;
o. the economic state of the art market at or around the time of
valuation;
o:° a record of any exhibitions at which the particular art object had
been displayed; and
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*

a statement as to the standing of the artist in his profession and
in the particular school or time period.

12. In Smith Est. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), acq. 1974-2
C.B. 4, aff'd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975), the Tax
Court listed the criteria on which it relied to value, for estate tax purposes, a large
number of pieces of sculpture owned by an artist at his death. After recognizing that a
large block of the artist" work placed on the market at one time would necessarily
depress the fair market value of the works involved (similar to the blockage concept in
securities), the court listed the following factors:
o. the decedent's reputation as a sculptor;
o. the acceptability of the medium and the style in which the artist
worked;
*

the size, period, and quality of the particular works involved;

*

the tendency of the artist to work in a series, and whether the
individual items constituted a complete series,

o'othe number of sales in the 25 years preceding the artist's death,
and the prices paid immediately before and after his death; and
°. the inconvenient location of the items and the feasibility of their
being transported to an area easily accessible to potential
buyers.
Note: In a case involving the valuation of large tracts of land
13.
the Tax Court relied mainly on the testimony of the IRS' expert
Arkansas,
located in
witness. Some of the factors considered by the Government's witness in reaching the
price per acre were:
a.

the size of the acreage involved and the problem involved in
selling such a large amount of land;

b.

the number of tracts involved;

c.

the accessibility of the tracts;

d.

the site potential;

e.

the volume of timber present and its state of growth;

f.

sales of comparable land; and

g.

the highest and best use of the land.

The expert also took into account the fact that a person would need a
large sales organization to sell the tracts and that the titles to all the and were not
secured. The court also considered the prices that were paid per acre in the sales
made after the decedent's death as being significant in affirming the expert's
determination. Broadhead Est. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1972-195 (1972),
reconsideration granted, T.C. Memo 1973-222 (1973).
14.
Comment: An important decision for all taxpayers in valuation
cases is that of the Sixth Circuit in Akers v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1986),
rev'g T.C. Memo 1984-208 (1984), on remand, T.C. Memo 1992-476 (1992). There, the
court rejected the Tax Court's compromise valuation of property donated to charity
because it failed to explain the process it used to value it. The Sixth Circuit refused to
accept the Tax Court's practice of picking at random "any number that happens to lie...
between the Commissioner's valuation and the taxpayer's." The court stated that the
valuation must be substantiated both for the litigants and for the purpose of any
subsequent appeals.
15.
Be aware of how the IRS auditor will approach the issue of
valuation. A good source of information may be found in the Internal Revenue Manual
pertaining to both Examination and Appeals, as well as in the IRS Valuation Training
course book. Located in the Appendices to this outline you will find relevant excerpts
from both resources as they pertain to challenging the valuation of different asset
classifications.
V.

Discovery of Expert Witnesses in U.S. Tax Court
A.

Background

Historically, litigants in the Tax Court were prohibited from taking discovery
depositions of their opponents' experts. Instead, a party's discovery options were
limited to serving interrogatories on an opposing party pursuant to Tax Court Rule 71(d).
The ability to obtain information through interrogatories about an expert witness that an
opposing party expects to call at trial remains available. However, effective July 1,
1990, the Tax Court adopted Tax Court Rule 76 which permits the limited use of
depositions. Official Notes to Tax Ct. R. 76, 93 T.C. 910-13 (1989).
B.

Discovery of Information by Interrogatories

Written interrogatories may be used to require a party to provide
information as to any expert witnesses expected to be called at trial. Interrogatories
may request a party to disclose:
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(i)

each person whom that party expects to call as an expert witness
at trial, giving the name, address, and occupation of the expert
together with a statement of such expert's qualifications;

(ii)

the subject matter and substance of facts and opinions to which
such expert is expected to testify; and

(iii)

a summary of the grounds for each opinion of such expert. Tax Ct.
R. 71(d)(1).

In lieu of providing the foregoing information in the form of answers to
interrogatories, the responding party may provide the proponent a copy of an expert
witness report containing such information. Id. Under Tax Ct. R. 143(f), an expert
witness report is required even if responses to the proponent's request for the
information identified in Tax Ct. R. 71 (d)(1) are provided in the form of answers to
interrogatories.
C.

Depositions of Experts

1.
Tax Court Rule 76 allows a deposition to be taken of an opposing
party's expert witness in certain limited circumstances. The deposition of an expert
witness can occur either by consent of the parties or pursuant to a compulsory
deposition. If the deposition is consensual, the provisions of Tax Court Rule 74 apply.
Tax Ct. R. 76(a)(1). In the case of a compulsory deposition, the procedural provisions
of Tax Court Rule 76 govern, including the limitation that nonconsensual depositions are
considered "an extraordinary method of discovery." Id. 76(a)(2).
2.
Rule 76 limits the scope of the examination of the expert to the
following areas of inquiry:
(i)

knowledge, skill experience, training, or education that
qualifies the witness to testify as an expert;

(ii)

the expert's opinion;

(iii)

the facts or data supporting the expert's opinion; and

(iv)

any analysis that demonstrates how the conclusion of the
expert resulted from the underlying facts or date. Id. 76(b).

3.
To institute the compulsory deposition process, a motion must be
filed by the party desiring to depose an expert witness. Id. 76(d)(1). The motion must
be filed after a notice of trial has been issued or the case has been assigned to a judge
and must be completed within the general discovery cutoff deadline, i.e., 45 days prior

to the call of the trial calendar for the case. Tax Ct. R. 76(c), and 70(a)(2). The motion
must include the following matters:
(i)

The name and address of the witness.

(ii)

A description of any books, papers, documents, or other
things to be produced at the deposition.

(iii)

A statement of the issues to which the expert's testimony
relates and the reasons for deposing the witness.

(iv)

The proposed time and place for the deposition.

(v)

The officer before whom the deposition is to be taken.

(vi)

Any provision as to the payment of costs and fees.

(vii)

If the deposition is to be videotaped, the name and address
of the videotape operator and the operator's employer. Tax
Ct. R. 76(d)(2).

If the deposition will be taken using written questions, a copy of the questions to
be propounded must be attached.
After the motion is filed, the opposing party has a 15-day period
4.
after service of the motion in which to object or otherwise respond to the motion. Id.
76(d)(3). Unless the parties agree by stipulation for the handling of fees and expenses
of the expert witness, such fees and expenses typically will be allocated to the party
taking the deposition. Id. 76(g)(2).
D.

Expert Witness Reports

Under Tax Court Rule 143(f), an expert witness is required to
1.
prepare a written expert witness report setting forth the expert's qualifications and the
expert's opinion and facts or data on which the opinion is based. The report should also
state in detail the reasons for the expert's conclusions. Tax Ct. R. 143(f)(1).
An expert witness report is required to be made available to the
2.
Court and the opposing party for each expert called as a witness. A copy of the report
must be furnished to the Court and the opposing party at least 30 days before the call of
the trial calendar on which the case appears. However, the deadline for submitting the
expert witness report under Tax Ct. R. 143 does not extend the time in which a party
must answer interrogatories to the extent such part decides to furnish a copy of the
expert witness report in lieu of answers to interrogatories. Id. 71 (d)(2). Typically, the

parties will voluntarily and simultaneously exchange expert witness reports before the
30-day limit under Tax Court Rule 143(f). See CCDM (35)5(15)1(2) (Mar. 26, 1991).
In appropriate cases, the court may order that the deposition
3.
transcript of an expert witness serve as the expert witness report required by Tax Court
Rule 143(f). Tax Ct. R. 143(f)(3), 76(e)(1). To utilize the deposition transcript in lieu of
the expert witness report, the proponent of the expert witness must apply to the Court
by written motion. Tax Ct. R. 76(e)(1).
E.

Discovery of Expert Witnesses Not Expected to Testify

Although the discovery rules applicable in United States district courts and
the Court of Federal Claims provide, in limited instances, for the discovery of the
opinions held by experts who have been retained by another party in anticipation of
litigation or preparation for trial, but who are not expected to testify, the Tax Court Rules
contain no similar provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P.26(b)(4)(B); Fed. Cl. R. 26(b)(3)(B)
(discovery is allowed only "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it
is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same
subject by other means").
VI.

Expert Witness Testimony in Tax Court

1.
An expert witness must provide the Tax Court and the opposing
party with a written expert witness report. See CCDM 35(641) to 35 (649) for a
discussion of the procedures followed by IRS Chief Counsel attorneys in selecting and
contracting with an expert witness.
2.

The report must bet set forth:
a.

the qualifications of the witness;

b.

the expert's opinion;

c.

the underlying facts supporting the expert's opinion; and

d.

the reasons for the expert's conclusion. Tax Ct. R. 143(f)(1).
Tax Court Rule 143(f)(1) was amended effective August 1,
1998, to clarify that the expert witness reports are not to be
filed with the Court until after the case is calendared for trial
or has been assigned to a judge or special trial judge.

The expert report must be submitted not later than 30 days before
3.
the call of the trial calendar on which the case appears. Some judges now require
exchange of expert reports 90 to 120 days prior to calendar call, with rebuttal reports to
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be filed 30 to 45 days prior to trial. The intended purpose of this accelerated schedule
is to encourage settlements.
4.
If an expert witness report is not prepared and provided, the
witness' testimony may be excluded, unless the failure is shown to be due to good
cause and the failure does not unduly prejudice the opposing party, such as by
significantly impairing the opposing party's ability to cross-examine the expert witness or
denying the ability to obtain rebuttal evidence. Tax Ct. R. 143(f)(1). See Yates v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1215, 1228 (1989) expert who failed to provide timely report
was not permitted to testify on direct, but only in rebuttal of opposing party's experts);
Keogh v. Commissioner, 75 AFTR2d 1698 (2d. Cir. 1995) (unpublished opinion;
upholding exclusion of expert witness where report filed three days prior to trial).
Malachinski v. Commissioner, 268 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming Tax Court's
exclusion of direct testimony of expert as to factual basis for her conclusion where it
was not previously set forth in written report).
5.
Ordinarily, the expert's written report is intended to serve as the
direct testimony. However, additional testimony with respect to the report will be
permitted to clarify or emphasize matters in the report, to cover matters arising after the
preparation of the report, or otherwise at the discretion of the Court. Tax Ct. R. 143(f).
6.
The Court has discretion to not require an expert witness report if a
timely request is made. Id. 143(f)(1). However, the Court ordinarily will not grant such a
request where the expert witness' testimony is based on third-party contacts,
comparable sales, or other detailed, technical information. Such a request may be
granted, for example, where the expert witness testifies only with respect to industry
practice or in rebuttal to another expert report. Id. 143(f)(2).
7.
The Tax Court Rules do not specifically provide for the appointment
of an expert witness by the Court. See Fed. R. Evid. 706. However, the Court has, on
occasion, directed one party to procure an expert witness at the party's expense.
Holland v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding Tax Court order, but
finding it "unusual" but in general compliance with Fed. R. Evid. 614 which allows court
to call witnesses on its own motion). See also Argo Science Co. v. Commissioner, 58
TCM (CCH) 1093, 1103 (1989), afftd, 927 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 934
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1991). More recently, the Tax Court used two court-appointed
experts in Bank One Corporation v. Commissioner, Docket Nos. 5759-95, 5756-97,
where the valuation of financial derivatives under Section 475 is involved. Under the
stipulated terms of the arrangement, the two experts are permitted to confer with each
other ex parte, they are not subject to discovery except by written interrogatories, and
their fees are shared equally by the parties. Of particular interest is the statement in the
stipulation that "[n]othing in this stipulation should be construed as respondent's
acquiescence to this procedure as a matter of tax litigation policy or that respondent
would agree to a similar procedure in any other case."
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8.
Although it may not arbitrarily disregard the testimony of an expert
witness, Wekhausen v. Commissioner, 56 TCM (CCH) 299 (1988), the Tax Court has
broad discretion in determining the weight to be accorded to such testimony. Parker v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 562 (1986). See Utilicorp United, Inc. v. Commissioner,
104 T.C. 670 (1995) (IRS valuation expert permitted to testify despite contention that
state law was violated). In considering expert testimony, the Tax Court, as the trier of
fact, can use its best judgment and adopt portions of the testimony and reject others.
Estate of Rodriquez v. Commissioner, 56 TCM (CCH) 1033, 1038 (1989). See also
Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1991) (Tax Court discretion upheld to
disregard portions of expert report and formulate its own valuation method); Silverman
v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2nd Cir. 1976); Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.
722, 734 (1985); IT&S of Iowa, Inc. v Commissioner, 97 T.C. 496, 508 (1991); Estate of
Mitchell v Commissioner, 74 TCM (CCH) 872 (1997) rev'd and remanded on this point,
250 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001); Estate of Fleming v Commissioner, 74 TCM (CCH) 1049
(1997).
9.
In this regard, the Tax Court has been particularly vocal in
criticizing the testimony of expert witnesses who appear to be partisan advocates,
particularly in valuation cases. The Court has not identified specific factors that
establish such a finding, but the cases in which this criticism has been made fall into
several identifiable categories.
a.

when the expert's methodology is materially flawed by
disregarding relevant factors or giving undue weight to
certain factors;

Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193 (1990); Hall v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312 (1989) (expert had been directed to ignore the effect
of certain facts, resulting in an "artificial and excessive value"); Laureys v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 101,126-29 (1989) (erroneous assumptions and
"overzealous effort" by expert in areas beyond his expertise); Estate of Mueller v.
Commissioner, 63 TCM (CCH) 3027, 3027-9 to 3027-14 (1992) ("results
oriented" report in which the expert "became a shill" for the Commissioner);
Resser v. Commissioner, 62 TCM (CCH) 617,625 (1991) ("report based upon
unrealistic and unreliable factual premises" coupled with improper conclusions as
to legal issues made the expert "unhelpful and unnecessary in making our factual
findings"); A. Ross Winans Grantor Trust v. Commissioner, 58 TCM (CCH) 884,
903 (1989) (Service expert "biased" as evidenced by his reliance on a single
source of data.
b.

when the expert's report or testimony reflects a
stubborn adherence to a particular methodology or
otherwise indicates a lack of objectivity;
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Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 371 (1991) ("resultoriented" opinion based on questionable assumptions by expert who was
"unresponsive, evasive, and equivocal on examination"); Messing v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967) cautioning against "overzealous efforts.
• . to infuse a talismanic precision to valuation"); Mooneyham v. Commissioner,
61 TCM (CCH) 2445, 2447 (1991) (expert's opinion should be "based on
objective information that he independently has available or secures, not
information blatantly foisted on him by a party's representative"); Estate of
Hatchett v. Commissioner, 58 TCM (CCH) 801, 808-09 (1989) (expert ignored
approach recommended by American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers);
Williamette Indus v. Commissioner, 64 TCM (CCH) 202, 212 (1992) (lack of
objectivity "evidenced by the adversarial stance he took early in the proceedings
and never abandoned").
c.

the expert's opinion and explanation displays an
argumentative or disparaging tone;

Estate of Hatchett v. Commissioner, 58 TCM (CCH) 801, 809 n3 (1989)
(expert testified that "I would say that in 18 and a half years of real estate
appraisal experience the inclusion of these sales is the most absurd, unethical
thing I've seen a real estate appraiser do"); A. Ross Winans Grantor Trust v.
Commissioner, 58 TCM (CCH) 884, 903 (1989) ("argumentative and biased
analysis"). See also Vangeloff v. Commissioner, 64 TCM (CCH) 660, 667 (1992)
(expert testified that he was hired for the purpose of limiting the taxpayer's
claimed deduction); Johnson v. Commissioner, 63 TCM (CCH) 3197, 31979-5
(1992), reh'g granted on another issue, 65 TCM (CCH) 2465 (1993); Williamette
Indus v. Commissioner, 54 TCM (CCH) 616, 624 (1987) (opposing experts
labeled as members of the "flat earth society").
d.

the expert opines in areas in which he or she has no
particular expertise or makes legal conclusions;

Seagate Tech. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149, 272 (1994); Laureys v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 101,129 (1989); Resser v. Commissioner, 62 TCM
(CCH) 617, 625 (1991).
e.

where the expert declines to reveal the sources for his
or her opinions; Seagate Tech v. Commissioner, 102
T.C. 149, 265, 271 (1994); and

f.

where the opinion varies widely from the other experts'
opinions in the case.
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Jacobson v. Commissioner, 58 TCM (CCH) 645, 650 (1989); Mathis v.
Commissioner, 57 TCM (CCH) 519, 524-26 (1989). See Frazee v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554, 577-78 (1992) (expert's inability to explain wide
disparity gave appearance that expert was "merely acting as an advocate");
Sundstrant Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 370 (1991) (same); Estate of
Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 244 (1990). See also Neeley v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 945 (1985) (evidence that taxpayer had "shopped"
for an appraiser who could provide the desired price range).
No one of the above factors will be dispositive, but the presence of one or
two will almost certainly result in the opinion being given little weight, and the
confluence of multiple factors will likely result in the exclusion of the expert's
testimony. See Estate of Halas v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 570; 578 (1990) (citing
the Principles of Appraisal Practice and Code of Ethics, the Court noted that "an
appraiser has a duty to the Court that exceeds his duty to his client"). See also
Hamblen, The Changing Tide of Tax Court Litigation: Large Case Management,
14 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 10 (1994) ("experts would do well to remember that their sole
purpose is to assist the Court").
The Tax Court also has criticized experts who have a conflict of
9.
interest. In this regard, the Court has held that where an expert has had a prior
relationship with an opposing party, the expert will be disqualified if he or she received
confidential information concerning the party seeking disqualification as a result of his or
her prior relationship with that party. Estate of Halas v. Commissioner, 58 TCM (CCH)
280 (1989), as supplemented by 94 T.C. 570 (1990). If such showing is not made, the
expert will not be disqualified. See Estate of Clapp v. Commissioner, 47 TCM (CCH)
504, 505 n5 (1983) (expert unaware of his partner's previous appraisal). See generally
FPL Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-92 (2002) (testimony of in-house
attorney as to state regulatory law was inadmissible for reason that "testimony that
expresses a legal conclusion and does not assist the Court is not admissible").
VII.

Business Valuation Theory and Principles
A.

Overview

1.
The three generally accepted approaches to business valuation are
the income approach, the asset-based approach and the market approach. These
three approaches are similar to the income, cost and market approaches used in real
estate valuation.
The value of any business, from a financial point of view, is equal to
2.
the present value of the expected future economic benefits to the owners. The discount
rate used in the calculation of present value is equal to the cost of capital that would be
required to attract investment.
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a.

This highlights the forward-looking nature of the valuation
process. The past is irrelevant, except to the extent it helps
us forecast the future. Development stage companies
would be worthless if the past was all that mattered.

b.

Because two reasonable appraisers can have entirely
different views about the future, they may reach value
conclusions that differ dramatically. There is
much truth to the statement that valuation is as much
art as science.

c.

The discounted future benefits method determines value by
taking a stream of future economic benefits (such as
earnings or cash flow) and discounts them to the present at
an appropriate discount rate. To use the this method, the
appraiser must estimate future benefits and determine the
appropriate discount rate to apply to them.

d.

The capitalization of benefits method estimates value by
taking a representative economic benefit level and dividing
by a capitalization rate to convert the benefit to value. The
capitalization rate is equal to the discount rate (discussed
above) less the projected growth rate of the economic
benefits.

3.
The market comparison approach draws on actual transactions in
the market place to determine value. Value is estimated by using one or more methods
to compare the subject company to similar businesses or securities for which market
values are available.
a.

When utilizing the market approach to valuation, the
underlying expectations of investors as to future
returns and risk are inherently incorporated into priceto-earnings multiples, capitalization rates and other
value measures.

b.

The market value data for other companies may come
from completed acquisition transactions, stock market
data for companies which are actively traded, or from
private placement transactions. Regardless of the
source of data, the objective is to estimate the value
of the subject company based upon the relationships
of market value to the underlying characteristics of the
guideline companies.

4.
The asset-based approach to valuation looks to the value of the
underlying assets of a business. The sum of the value of all assets, including intangible
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assets such as goodwill, less the value of all liabilities, contingent or otherwise, yields
an estimate of the value of the entity.
a.

b.

The asset-based approach is generally not as
relevant as an earnings-based approach when
valuing a going concern business. Buyers of going
concern businesses are more interested in future
cash flows, earnings and dividends rather than asset
values. This is especially true for minority owners
who lack the ability to sell or liquidate an entity's
assets.
As a general rule, the asset-based approach is more
appropriately suited to holding companies, such as
real estate investment companies, or companies
where liquidation is imminent.

5.
Many owners (e.g., shareholders, limited partners and members)
have no direct claim on an entity's assets.
a.

As a result, the value of their fractional ownership
interest may be worth more or less than a pro rata
share of the value of the entity.

6.
Ownership interests in closely-held entities rarely enjoy the liquidity
of interests that are actively traded on stock exchanges or in the over-the-counter
market.
a.

Lack of marketability, or the inability of an owner to
quickly convert his interest into cash, is a factor which
affects value.

7.
Minority owners lack control over business decisions and,
therefore, are usually worth less than the proportionate share of the assets to which
they attach.
a.

Minority owners generally lack the right to elect a
majority of directors, appoint management, determine
management compensation and perquisites, make
acquisitions or sales, make distributions or determine
the future direction of the business.

b.

B.

The minority interest discount and the lack of
marketability discount are separate but interrelated
concepts. Controlling interests in a business may
suffer from lack of marketability, but generally not to
the same degree as minority interests.

General Valuation Discounts
1.

Minority interest (lack of control) discount
a.

Rev. Rul. 93-12 CB 202 dramatically increased the
use of minority interest discounts among planners.
Previously, the Internal Revenue Service (the
"Service") routinely disallowed minority interest
discounts in the case of family-owned businesses.

b.

The immense popularity of family limited partnerships
(FLPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs) as
estate planning vehicles was spawned by Rev. Rul.
93-12. Many advisors and appraisers take the view
that cash and marketable securities "wrapped" into a
family limited partnership may be discounted by 40%
or more for federal transfer tax purposes

c.

The Service has attempted to use arguments other than
family attribution to shut down FLPs as discount planning
vehicles, but a statutory change may be needed to limit their
attractiveness. The typical challenges by the Service are
discussed later in this outline. However, the simple truth is
that minority interests in FLPs really are worth less than the
pro rata share of the underlying assets.

d.

The level of control inherent in any business interest
extends from absolute control to the absolute lack of
control. See Exhibit C.
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2.

3.

Lack of marketability discount
a.

Ownership interests in closely held entities do not
trade in an active and efficient market. The inability of
an owner to readily convert his interest into cash
makes his interest less valuable than an identical
interest which is readily convertible into cash.

b.

Numerous empirical studies on this subject have been
conducted over the past 30 years and these studies
have generally supported discounts of 25% to 50% for
lack of marketability. For the restricted stock of
publicly traded companies, discounts may be falling
due to the availability of derivatives which limit risk
during the restricted period. In addition, the holding
period under SEC Rule 144 has been decreased from
two to one year. See Exhibit B for a further
discussion of lack of marketability discounts.

Built-in capital gains tax
a.

More than 10 years after the repeal of General Utilities,
the Tax Court has handed down a decision permitting the
taxpayer to consider built-in taxes in the valuation of
stock in a C corporation. Estate of Artemus D. Davis v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530 (1998). A portion of the
built-in capital gains tax liability was included as a part of
the lack of marketability discount.

b.

The Service had repeatedly argued that built-in capital
gains taxes were not a factor unless liquidation was
imminent or, alternatively, that the tax could be avoided
by converting a C corporation to S corporation status and
waiting 10 years before selling its assets. Judge Chiechi
pointed out what all merger and acquisition advisors
know, that buyers and sellers would take low-basis
assets into account when negotiating price.

c.

Additionally, the Second Circuit vacated a Tax Court Decision
(T.C. Memo 1997-483) disallowing a reduction in the value of
stock in a real estate C corporation for the potential capital gains
tax liability. Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50 (2d
Cir.1998). The Second Circuit stated that "a hypothetical willing
buyer today would likely pay less for the shares of a corporation
because of the buyer's inability to eliminate the contingent tax
liability," and remanded the case in order for the Tax Court to

ascertain Mrs. Eisenberg's gift tax liability. The Second Circuit
also noted that the full amount of the potential capital gains is
not necessarily what should be subtracted from the fair market
value of the underlying real estate.
d.

4.

5.

VIII.

Partnership's and LLC's without a valid Section 754 election in
place may also be eligible to recognize a discount for a built-in
capital gain tax liability as may Shareholders in S corporations.

Fractional interest discounts
a.

The discount applied to an undivided interest in an asset, such
as real estate. Much like a minority owner, a co-owner of
property lacks the ability to take certain actions.

b.

Co-owners have the right to file suit to partition the jointly owned
property. The Service has generally tried to limit the discount to
the cost of the partition suit. However, because of the cost of
the suit and the uncertainties and the delays involved, the courts
have recently been more receptive to the larger discounts being
put forth by co-owners.

Other discounts
a.

Other common discounts applicable to closely-held businesses
include: (i) dependence upon a key employee, (ii) product
obsolescence, (iii) dependence upon a key customer or
supplier, (iv) lack of geographic or product diversification, (v)
high cost of capital or excessive debt leverage, (vi) unfavorable
contracts and (vii) under-performing or nonproductive assets.

b.

While the above discounts exist at many closely held
companies, they are not tools to be implemented as a part of
the estate planning process. Lack of marketability and minority
interest discounts are by far the most commonly utilized
discounts in the estate planning process.

Recent Developments in Business Valuation
A.

Peter S. Peracchio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-280 (September 25,
2003)
1.

A case involving the calculations of discounts for lack of control and
marketability for a FLP holding only cash and marketable securities.
The taxpayer formed a FLP in 1997 with $2,008,370 of cash and
marketable securities. Immediately after formation, the taxpayer sold
and gifted limited partner interests to a family trust and his son. In his
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1997 gift tax return, the taxpayer claimed a combined discount of 40%.
Although the IRS initially challenged any discount, at trial the IRS
argued for a discount of 4.4% for lack of control and 15% for lack of
marketability. The Court was relatively unhappy with the testimony of
all of the expert witnesses on both sides and arrived at a 6% minority
discount and a 25% discount for lack of marketability.
B.

Clarissa W. Lappo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-258 (September 3,
2003)
1.

C.

Clarissa Lappo and her daughter formed a FLP in 1996, funding it with
real estate and marketable securities consisting mostly of municipal
bonds. The IRS challenged the valuation of two gifts of limited
partnership interests in 1996, in particular the minority interest discount
related to the real estate and overall lack of marketability discount.
Both the IRS and taxpayer expert witness agreed that REITs were the
appropriate starting point for the minority interest discount applicable to
the real estate, but disagreed in their adjustments. After reviewing the
evidence presented on price to net asset value ratios for REITs and
the differences between publicly traded REITs and private partnership
interests, the Court arrived at a 19% minority interest discount for the
real estate. For the overall marketability discount, the Court analyzed
the raw data in studies performed by Dr. Bajaj and Hertzel & Smith, as
well as considerations raised by both appraisers, to arrive at a final
marketability discount of 24%.

Johann and Johanna Hess, T.C. Memo 2003-251 (August 20, 2003)
1.

This case involved a dispute over the value of the shares of a closely
held C corporation. In 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Hess gifted shares in Hess
Industries, their closely held C corporation, assigning a value of
$120,000 to each of the ten shares gifted. The IRS disagreed,
asserting a value of $253,000 per share in the deficiency notice.
Previously, a retiring shareholder was paid $4,000,000 for 20 shares,
an eight-year non-compete, and a three-year employment agreement.
At trial, the taxpayer appraiser asserted a $128,000 value, while the
IRS valuation expert asserted a $269,000 value. The taxpayer
appraiser used a DCF analysis and the market approach, although the
Court disagreed with an after-the-fact adjustment for reserves in the
DCF approach, and the minority interest discount taken in the market
approach since the market approach was based on minority
transactions. The IRS appraiser based his value on a weighting of net
asset value, the prior stock transaction, the shareholder agreement
and the guideline public company method. The Court, agreeing with
some, but not all, of the arguments of both sides, decided on a value of
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$200,000 per share, just slightly higher than the average of the two
appraisals.
D.

Albert and Christine Hackl v. Commissioner, 335 F.3d 664 (7 th Cir. 2003)
1.

E.

Estate of Helen A. Deputy, T.C. Memo 2003-176 (June 13, 2003)
1.

F.

The Tax Court ruled in Hackl that gifts of LLC interests were gifts of
future interests and therefore did not qualify for the annual gift tax
exclusion. The Hackls' argument on appeal was that a gift is not a gift
of a future interest if the donors give up all of their legal rights and that
their position reflected the meaning of "future interest" in the statute.
The 7 th Circuit upheld the decision, noting that even though the voting
shares that the Hackls gave away had the same legal rights as those
they retained, the LLC Operating Agreement restrictions on
transferability of the shares meant that they were essentially without
immediate value to the donees. The 7 th Circuit also noted that the
onus in this case is on the taxpayers, and the Hackls failed to show
that their transfers qualify for the gift tax exclusion.

At her death on September 15, 1997, Helen Deputy owned an interest
in a FLP that owned 19.99% of Godfrey Conveyer Co., Inc., a
recreational boat builder. The IRS challenged the valuation of gifts
made in May and July of 1997 as well as the estate valuation.
Specifically the IRS disagreed with the taxpayer on the value of
Godfrey, but agreed that the value determined by the Tax Court as of
September 17, 1997 would also be used for the prior partnership gifts.
The Tax Court sided with the IRS expert on the notion that the income
approach was the sole appropriate approach for this valuation. The
Court also sided with the IRS expert's 10% capitalization rate,
including a negative 5.2% industry risk, citing the IRS expert's use of
real data and calling the taxpayer's assumptions subjective. The IRS
expert applied no minority discount reasoning that the capitalized
earnings approach would result in treating all interests in the entity
equally, but did determine a 25% discount for lack of marketability
based on two restricted stock studies. The taxpayer expert arrived at a
combined discount of 44% based on a matrix constructed by his firm
that assigned a numerical value to a number of qualitative issues,
including attributes of control and company outlook. Although the Tax
Court disagreed with the discounts of both parties, it did use the matrix
as a guide, concluding a 30% combined discount was appropriate.

Estate of Albert Stranqi, T.C. Memo 2003-145 (May 20, 2003)
1.

This case was remanded from the Fifth Circuit. Shortly before his
death in 1994, Mr. Strangi transferred 98% of his assets to a family
limited partnership (SFLP). In 2000, a sharply divided Tax Court held:
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(1) SLFP was valid under state law and would be recognized for estate
tax purposes, (2) I.R.C. §2703(a) did not apply to the partnership
agreement, and (3) the transfer of assets to the partnership was not a
taxable gift. The IRS appealed to the Fifth Circuit and requested to
amend its claim to add the §2036 claim, which would require the estate
to include the assets transferred by Mr. Strangi to SFLP rather than
just his partnership interest in SFLP. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with
the Tax Court's denial of the IRS's request and reversed the Tax Court
on that issue. On remand, however, the Tax Court determined that the
transfers to SFLP met the test under both §2036(a)(1) and §2036(a)(2)
and ruled the full amount of the assets transferred was to be included
as part of decedent's estate, relying on Estate of Harper v.
Commissioner, T. C. Memo 2002-121.
G.

McCord v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. No. 13 (May 14, 2003) (currently on
Appeal to 5th Circuit)
1.

H.

This case involves the determination of a discount for lack of
marketability and control in a family limited partnership and the amount
of a charitable donation of limited partnership interests. The Tax Court
rejected pre-IPO studies and some restricted stock studies, ultimately
siding with the IRS in using a variant of the restricted stock approach,
termed the private placement approach, to determine the marketability
discount. Also, the Court determined that the amount of the charitable
donation should be based on the fair market value determined by the
taxpayer's appraiser and not the amount determined pursuant to a
formula clause that kicked in as the result of an audit adjustment.

Estate of Natalie M. Leichter, T.C. Memo 2003-66 (March 6, 2003)
1.

Natalie M. Leichter died in 1995, owning 100% of Harlee International,
Inc., a California S corporation that imported and distributed waterbeds
and futons. An appraiser for the estate determined the fair market
value of Harlee to be $2,091,750 and the IRS determined a value of
$2,718,258 (lowered to $2,150,000 at trial) for during examination of
the estate. The estate claimed that errors were made during the
original valuation and submitted new valuations of $863,000 and
$400,000. However, the Court called the errors "orthographic" and
gave these new valuations no weight. The Court determined the value
of $2,091,750 reported on the decedent's tax return was proper.

Raymond J. Martin, et al., Plaintiffs v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber
Products Corp., et al., Defendants, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, Case No. 3:00CV7642
1.

The case involved disputes over the proper level of discounts for lack
of control and marketability and the treatment of the tax on built-in
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gains for a C corporation. The Court accepted a 15% discount for lack
of control and a 30% discount for lack of marketability suggested by an
appraiser hired jointly at the suggestion of the Court. However, the
Court disagreed with all three appraisers on the built-in gains tax
adjustment, ruling that the tax should be recorded at its present value,
not the full amount of the tax at the valuation date. The Court cited
Estate of Pauline Welch v. C.I.R., 208 F.3d 213, 2000 WL 263309, **4
nd
(6th Cir. 2000) and Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50, 57 (2
Cir. 1998).
J.

David A. Kimbell Sr., et al. v. United States, No. 7:01-CV-0218-R, United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
1.

K.

The case concerns the valuation of a family limited partnership. Ruth
Kimball created the FLP two months before her death in 1998, with her
revocable living trust as a 99% limited partner and a Texas LLC as a
1% limited partner. Ruth owned 50% of the LLC and her son, David,
owned the other 50%. David was also a co-trustee with Ruth of the
revocable trust and manager of the LLC. Ruth, through her 99%
ownership of the limited partnership interests, retained the right to
remove the general partner since the FLP agreement provided that
70% in interest of the limited partners could remove the general
partner. The estate and the IRS differed on their valuations of the
partnership and the estate sued for a refund after paying the disputed
taxes. The Court held under IRC §2036, that an estate must include
the value of assets that had been transferred to a partnership instead
of the partnership interest actually owned by the estate. The Court
determined that their was no bona fide sale and that the decedent
retained the power to designate who would benefit from the
partnership, negating the two exceptions to inclusion under IRC §2036.

Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-246 (September 26,

2002) (On appeal to the 3rd Circuit)
1.

Two years before his death, Theodore Thompson formed two family
limited partnerships using the "Fortress Plan," transferring substantially
all of his investment assets to these partnerships. However, the
partnerships were set up so that Mr. Thompson received distributions
that he used to make gifts to family members and pay his own
personal expenses. The IRS challenged the estate valuation, claiming
that the partnerships lacked economic substance and should be
ignored for transfer tax purposes. The IRS also claimed that since Mr.
Thompson retained economic benefit and control of the transferred
assets, §2036(a) should apply. The Court concluded that the
partnerships did have economic substance, but that §2036(a) should
apply since Mr. Thompson did retain economic benefit of the property.
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Therefore, the full date-of-death value of the assets transferred were
included in the gross estate pursuant to §2036(a).
L.

Jeffrey L. Okerlund et. al. v. U.S., United States Court of Federal Claims,
Consolidated Nos. 99-133T & 99-134T (August 23, 2002)
1.

M.

Estate of Dunn v. Commissioner, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002)
1.

N.

This case involves the valuation of privately held wholesaler and
retailer of prepackaged food products for gift tax purposes in 1992 and
charitable donation purposes in 1994. For the 1992 valuation the
Court accepted the IRS expert's weighting of the market and income
approaches as well as his methodology for calculating freely-traded
value. The Court sided with the taxpayer expert on the discount for
lack of marketability however, citing the detailed analysis of restricted
stock and pre-IPO studies and allowing discounts of 40% in 1992 and
45% in 1994. Both sides agreed on a 5% discount for lack of voting
rights. Finally, since the IRS did not present expert testimony to
support its challenge to the 1994 valuation, the Court accepted the
value calculated by the taxpayer expert.

The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded Estate of Beatrice Dunn v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-12 (January 12, 2000), criticizing both
the IRS and the Tax Court's opinions concerning the valuation of Dunn
Equipment, a C corporation of which the decedent owned 62.96%.
During the original trial, the IRS argued that no discount should be
allowed for the trapped-in gains and no weight should be assigned to
the lower income approach value. Even though the IRS presenting
only an accounting expert to argue against the estate and not a
valuation expert to support its value, the Tax Court sided in part with
the IRS, accepting a 34% tax rate on the trapped-in gain and allowing
only 5% of the trapped-in gains as a reduction to the net asset value.
Additionally, the Tax Court assigned weights of 65% and 35% to the
asset approach and income approach, respectively. On remand, the
Fifth Circuit criticized the Commissioner's "extreme and unjustifiable
trial position" and the "legal, logical, and economic non sequitur"
assignments of the Tax Court's assignments of weights. The Fifth
Circuit concluded that 100% of the tax on the trapped-in taxable gain
for a C corporation must be subtracted under the asset approach and
that 85% of the final value should be determined using the income
approach, with a 15% weight assigned to the asset approach.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit told the Tax Court to entertain any claim
that the taxpayer might make under I.R.C. §7430, which awards
certain costs and fees to the taxpayer.

Estate of Bailey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-152 (June 17, 2002)
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1.

0.

Kerr v. Commissioner, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 0060903 (June 10, 2002)
1.

IX.

At his death in 1995, Lewis Bailey owned a 25% interest in C&L Bailey,
Inc., which owned and operated a motel in Arkansas and one in
California; additionally, Mr. Bailey was a beneficiary of a QTIP trust
owning 25% of the company. The Court disagreed with several
aspects of the taxpayer expert's testimony, including the use of a
"quick sale value" discount, the inclusion of $145,000 shareholder
liability treated as debt (saying the record did not substantiate the
liability), and the appropriateness of his reliability on pre-IPO studies in
determining the discount for lack of marketability. In the end, the Tax
Court sided with the IRS expert's net asset value despite the fact that it
contained little support for assumptions used in calculating the built-in
gains tax, but let stand the 50% combined discount for lack of control
and marketability claimed in the original estate tax return.

The Kerr's formed two Texas FLP's in 1993 and assigned a portion
of each to their children. The partnership agreements restricted
dispositions of partnership interests and the ability to dissolve the
partnerships. In 1994, the Kerr's each created a GRAT,
transferring to it a 44.5% limited partnership interest. The IRS
disagreed with the valuation as filed in gift tax returns and claimed
that the liquidation restrictions in the partnership agreements were
applicable restrictions under section 2704(b) and thus should have
been disregarded in the valuations. The Tax Court held that the
Kerr's transferred limited partnership interests to the GRATs, and
rejected the argument that they transferred only assignee interests.
The Tax Court also held that section 2704(b) did not apply since
the partnership agreements' liquidation restrictions weren't
applicable restrictions under section 2704(b)(3)(B) and reg. section
25.2704-2(b), thus allowing a discount for lack of marketability. The
Fifth Circuit upheld the ruling of the Tax Court.

Family Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies
A.

Since Rev. Rul. 93-12 in which the Service abandoned its position on family
attribution in the determination of fair market value, the FLP has grown rapidly
in importance as an estate planning tool. The FLP is extremely attractiveness
to planners for both tax and nontax reasons.
1.

Nontax. The older generation can indirectly transfer assets to the
younger generation without losing control while also protecting the
assets against creditors. Additionally, gifting of securities is easier
than direct gifts of fractional interests in property and economies of
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scale, diversification, competent management of assets and retention
of assets within the family unit are easier to accomplish.
2.

B.

Tax. As pass-through entities, FLPs avoid double taxation and, in
general, valuation discounts for limited partners of FLPs are greater
than for co-owners of fractional interests.

The Service continues to aggressively attack the use of FLPs as a means by
taxpayers to create valuation discounts for cash, marketable securities and
other assets not used in the active conduct of a trade or business. Their
avenues of attack have included:
1.

Sham transaction or device. Attempting to invalidate or ignore the
entity claiming that it was created solely for tax avoidance purposes,
was defective under state law or was without substance for federal
transfer tax purposes.

2.

Retained enjoyment under IRC Section 2036(a). Church v. United
States, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (W.D. Texas 2000), aff'd, 268 F.3d
1063 (5th Cir. 2001)(unpub). Estate of Dailey v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 2001-263 (2001); costs proceeding at T.C. Memo 2002-301
(2002). Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-202
(2000); later proceeding at T.C. Memo 2002-121 (2002). Kimbell v.
United States, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 523 (N.D. Texas 2003). Estate
of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144 (2000). Estate of
Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-242 (1997). Estate
of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 (2000); affd in part, rev'd in
part, remanded by Gulig v. Commissioner, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
11920 (5th Cir. 2002), see Appendix D for a detailed discussion of
Strangi. Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-246
(2002).

3.

Certain rights and restrictions disregarded under IRC Section 2703.
Church v. United States, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (W.D. Texas
2000), affd, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001)(unpub). Estate of Hall v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312 (1989). Estate of Jones v. Commissioner,
116 T.C. 121 (2001). Kerr v.Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), aff d,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 10965 (5th Cir. 2002). Knight v. Commissioner,
115 T.C. 506 (2000).). Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
144 (2000). ). Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478
(2000); aff d in part, rev'd in part, remanded by Gulig v. Commissioner,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 11920 (5th Cir. 2002).

4.

Certain "applicable restrictions" that limit the ability of the entity to
liquidate are disregarded under 2704(b). Estate of Harper v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-202 (2000); later proceeding at T.C.
Memo 2002-121 (2002). Estate of Jones v. Commissioner, 116 T.C.

121 (2001). Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), aff'd, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 10965 (5th Cir. 2002). Knight v. Commissioner, 115
T.C. 506 (2000). Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144
(2000). Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 (2000); affd
in part, rev'd in part, remanded by Gulig v. Commissioner, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11920 (5th Cir. 2002).

C.

5.

Gifts of future interests not qualifying for the gift tax exclusion under
IRC Section 2503(b). Hackl v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 279 (2002),
aff'd, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13936 (7th Cir. 2003).

6.

Disallowance of larger discounts for assignee interests versus
substitute limited partnership interests. Estate of Dailey v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2001-263 (2001); costs proceeding at T.C.
Memo 2002-301 (2002). Estate of Jones v. Commissioner, 116 T.C.
121 (2001). Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), aftd, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 10965 (5th Cir. 2002). However, the Tax Court has
accepted the taxpayer's argument in the following: Adams v. United
States, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13092 (N.D. Texas 2001). Church v.
United States, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (W.D. Texas 2000), aff'd,
268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001)(unpub). McCord v. Commissioner, 120
T.C. No. 13 (2003). Estate of Nowell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
1999-15 (1999).

7.

Gift upon formation of the partnership of a pro rata share of the
underlying assets rather than the partnership interest itself. Church v.
United States, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (W.D. Texas 2000), affd,
268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001)(unpub). Shepherd v. Commissioner,
115 T.C. 376 (2000), aff d, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 3165 (11th Cir.
2002).

Strangi has prompted a number of estate planners to consider what to advise
clients to do differently when creating FLPs and LLCs, or what should be
done, if anything, about FLPs and LLCs created in the past. As an aid in this
analysis, the following is a list of "badges" of the kind of retained interest or
control that in certain combinations could create estate tax problems under
Strangi and previous cases:
1.

Control of the entity by the transferor (in the facts underlying
Strangi, control was exercised through Mr. Strangi's son-in-law as
attorney-in-fact).

2.

Presence of a power of attorney, deathbed planning, or incapacity
when the entity is created

3.

Transfer of substantially all of the transferor's assets to the entity

4.

Transfer of a residence to the entity, with continued occupancy by
the transferor

5.

Tax-sensitive transfers defined by "audit-proofing" formulas

6.

Insubstantial interests in the entity held by other persons

7.

A token interest in the entity given to charity

8.

A pattern of administering the entity as a trust, such as responding
to the needs of the partner as a trustee would respond to the needs
of a trust beneficiary

9.

An entity that arguably has no cash needs of its own and therefore
lends itself to this pattern, including an entity holding only passive
investments such as stocks and bonds

10.

Terms in a partnership agreement or other operating document that
foster such a pattern, including (but not limited to) negation or
limitation of a general partner's or manager's ordinary fiduciary
duties

11.

Absence of an interposed independent trustee holding entity
interests

12.

Commingling of personal and entity funds or payment of personal
expenses by the entity

13.

Other conduct that disregards the structure or purpose of the entity

14.

Accomplishing no change or only a nominal change in the use and
management of the assets transferred to the entity

See http:lwww.aicpa.orq./members/div/taxlflapap.htm for the AICPA's white
paper on FLP valuation discounts which provides an excellent discussion and
analysis of the issues involved.
D.

Thoughts on valuation discounts and underlying partnership assets
1.

One school of thought states that the valuation discount depends
entirely upon the terms of the partnership agreement and it is irrelevant
whether the underlying asset is cash, marketable securities, real estate
or any other asset-type. According to this school, the marketability and
minority interest discounts are unaffected by the partnership's assets,
since it is the limited partnership interest itself that is being valued.
Instead, the valuation discounts hinge on the rights and obligations
bestowed upon the limited partner by the partnership agreement.
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E.

2.

Another school of thought, and the one to which this author
subscribes,
/
states that valuation discounts depend not just upon the rights (or lack
thereof) of the limited partner, but also on many other factors including,
among other things, the current economic environment, distribution
history and expectations, holding period expectations, interest rates,
partnership leverage and - yes - the nature of the underlying
partnership assets and their expected returns. See Exhibit E for a
listing of factors which affect FLP discounts.

3.

Assume you are to value a 10% limited partnership interest in
Partnership ABC which holds a non-income producing tract of raw land
with a current market value of $1 million; the land has an appreciation
expectation of 1% to 3% per annum, the partnership has an expected
life of 15 years and investors in real estate companies with equivalent
risk profiles demand a 10% rate of return. The present value of the
year 15 value of $1 million growing at 3% per annum and using a
discount rate of 10% is $0.37 million or a discount of 63%.

4.

Assume instead that you are to value a 10% limited partnership
interest in Partnership XYZ which holds a diversified stock portfolio
with a current market value of $1 million, the portfolio has an
appreciation expectation of 9% to 12% per annum, the partnership has
an expected life of 15 years and investors in investment companies
with equivalent risk profiles demand a 14% rate of return. The present
value of the year 15 value of $1 million growing at 12% per annum and
using a discount rate of $14% is $0.77 million or a discount of 23%.

State Law
1.

The size of any lack of control and lack of marketability discounts
applicable to an FLP is determined largely by the terms of the
partnership agreement and state law. A common mistake of many
appraisers is the failure to consider the impact of the agreement and
applicable state law on a partner's ability to realize the economic value
of his interest. It is simply inappropriate to apply "standard" discounts
in all FLP valuation engagements; every situation is unique.
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Exhibit A
International Valuation Guidance Note No. 6
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Exhibit B

Lack of Marketability Discount
Shares in closely held corporations do not enjoy the liquidity of shares actively
traded on stock exchanges or in the over-the-counter market. The inability of an owner to
quickly convert his shares into cash is a factor which affects value. It is widely recognized
that owners of shares in closely held businesses do not enjoy the same liquidity
experienced by shareholders of actively traded corporations. Empirical studies on this
subject have been conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Gelman,
Moroney, Baird & Co., Willamette Management Associates and various others. These
studies generally support discounts of 20% to 50% for lack of marketability. Listed below is
a summary of major studies on restricted stock:
Study

Years Covered

Average Discount

1966-69

25.8%

1966-69

25.5

Gelman 2

1968-70

33.0

Trout 3

1968-72

33.5

SEC (overall average)1
SEC Study (American

Exchange)1

Moroney 4

35.6

Maher 5

1969-73

35.4

Standard Research Consultants 6

1978-82

45.0

Willamette Management Associates 7

1981-84

31.2

1981-88

33.8

1980-96

27.1

1979-92

23.0

William L.

Silber 8

Management

Planning 9

FMV Opinions, Inc. 10

Source: Pratt, Reilly and Schweihs, "Valuing a Business "fourth edition, p. 404. Cites for each
individual study are presented below:
1From

"Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission," H.R. Doc.
No. 64, Part 5, 92d Congress,. 1st Session. 1971
2
From Milton Gelman, "An Economist-Financial Analyst's Approach to Valuing Stock of a Closely
Held Company," Journal of Taxation, June 1972
3From Robert R. Trout, "Estimation of the Discount Associated with the Transfer of Restricted
Securities," Taxes, June 1977
4
From Robert E. Moroney, "Most Courts Overvalue Closely Held Stocks," Taxes, March 1973
5From J. Michael Maher, "Discounts for Lack of Marketability for Closely Held Business Interests,"

Taxes, September 1976

-40-

6From "Revenue Ruling 77-287 Revisited," SRC Quarterly Reports, Spring 1983
7

From Willamette Management Associates Study (Unpublished) as reported in Shannon P. Pratt,
"Valuing a Business," Second Edition 1989
8

From William L. Silber, "Discounts on Restricted Stock: The Impact of Illiquidity on Stock Prices,"
Financial Analysts Journal, July-August 1991

9As reported in Shannon Pratt's Business Valuation Update Online, January 29, 1999
10

From Lance S. Hall and Timothy C. Polacek, "Strategies for Obtaining the Largest Valuation
Discounts," Estate Planning, January/February 1994

The studies on restricted stock transfers shown above include data on hundreds of
transactions from 1969 through 1997. In these studies, there were various reasons the
stock at hand was not freely marketable. However, in all cases the expectation was that
the buyer would be able to resell the stock in the public market. The ultimate path to
liquidity may have been via demand registration rights, piggyback registration rights, or
Rule 144. In any case, the restricted shares were expected to become freely marketable in
the foreseeable future. The results of these surveys are quite clear, investors demand to
be compensated for the impact of illiquidity on their stock. Furthermore, the size of the
compensation (in the form of a discount) in these studies has been found to be remarkably
consistent, generally in the range of 20% to 50%.
Another method for measuring the discount that investors demand for illiquidity
involves the study of private placement transactions occurring within a relatively short time
period before a public offering. John D. Emery of Robert W. Baird & Co., an investment
banking firm, conducted eight studies from 1980 through 1997 on private placements of
stock occurring within months of a public offering. The mean and median discounts for all
eight studies were 50% and 51 %, respectively. In all cases, the public offerings were
completed within five months after the private placement took place.
Willamette Management Associates has also performed eight studies similar to the
ones performed by Robert W. Baird & Co. However, in the Willamette study, private
transactions occurring within 36 months of the public offering were considered and overall
changes in industry stock prices were taken into account in arriving at the median discount.
The median discount for the eight Willamette studies ranged from 39% to 80%, with an
average discount of approximately 62%. These studies further confirm the substantial
discount demanded by investors for the impact of illiquidity.

Exhibit C

Lack of Control (minority interest) discounts

The degree of control, or lack thereof inherent in minority interest values, is
an important variable that affects shareholder value. With regard to a minority
interest, the courts have long recognized that "Minority stock interests in a closed
corporation are usually worth much less than the proportionate share of the assets
to which they attach." [Cravens v. Welch, 10 Fed. Supp. 94 (1935)]. Minority interest
discounts exist because minority owners lack control over the underlying assets of
the enterprise. Specifically, owners of minority interests generally lack the ability to
control or direct certain actions, such as the ability to elect a majority or any
directors, appoint management, or direct a sale, merger, liquidation or the payment
of dividend distributions. Accordingly, the minority shareholder is often unable to
realize many of the benefits associated with the underlying assets of a business.

Control Premium Studies
This lack of control causes the minority interest being valued to be worth less
than its pro-rata share of the entire company. A minority interest discount is the
mirror image of a majority interest or control premium. Accordingly, the size of a
minority interest discount can be estimated by observing the premiums paid by
acquirers when making acquisitions of controlling interests. Based on studies by
Mergerstat Review of acquisition transactions that occurred between 1987 and
2002, premiums paid for corporate control as observed by premiums paid for
controlling interests of publicly traded corporations have averaged approximately
40%. The inverse of the control premium is the minority discount. Therefore, the
average implied discount for minority shares is approximately 30% based on the
average control premium (calculated as 1 less the quotient of the pre-offer price
divided by the offer price). It should be noted, however, that these premiums are
based on a company's stock price shortly before the date the merger transaction
was announced. Because stock prices often rise shortly before such transactions
are announced, the premiums may be understated.

Simpson Control Hierarchy
The minority interest discount is more accurately called a lack of control
discount. Control should be viewed as a continuum from extremely limited for very
small minority interests to almost absolute for very large majority interests. The
Simpson Control Hierarchy, which is set forth below, is a model for analyzing the

levels of control available to stockholders. The hypothetical discount ranges shown
below are not those of Simpson, but are merely hypothetical ranges added for
illustrative purposes; each unique minority interest must be evaluated on its own.
When valuing an ownership interest in a business, the characteristics of a particular
ownership interest can be compared to those in the chart to assist the valuation
analyst in estimating an appropriate lack of control discount.
Level
1
2
3

Percentage
Owned
100%
>50%
>50%

Hypothetical
Discount
None
0 - 5%
0 - 10%

Control Rights
Absolute
Able to force liquidation, merger, etc.
Unable to force liquidation, able to control full board of
directors
4
>50%
5 - 10%
Unable to force liquidation, unable to control full board,
remaining ownership fragmented
5
>50%
10- 15%
Unable to force liquidation, unable to control full board,
remaining ownership concentrated
6
<50%
10 - 20%
Able to block major actions, able to obtain board seat,
remaining ownership is fragmented
7
<50%
10- 20%
Able to block major actions, able to obtain board seat,
remaining ownership is concentrated
8
<50%
15 - 20%
Able to block major actions, unable to obtain board seat,
remaining ownership is fragmented
9
<50%
15 - 25%
Able to block major actions, unable to obtain board seat,
remaining ownership is concentrated
10
<50%
20 - 30%
Unable to block major actions, able to obtain board seat,
remaining ownership is fragmented
11
<50%
20 - 30%
Unable to block major actions, able to obtain board seat,
remaining ownership is concentrated
12
<50%
25 - 35%
Unable to block major actions, unable to obtain board
seat, remaining ownership is fragmented
13
<50%
25 - 40%
Unable to block major actions, unable to obtain board
I_
seat, remaining ownership is concentrated
Source: David W. Simpson, "Minorty Interest and Marketability Discounts: A Perspective,"
Business Valuation Review, March 1991

Partnership Studies
Another manner in which to view minority interest discounts is by reference to
the trading prices of limited partnership interests in publicly traded partnerships.
During the 1980's, real estate limited partnerships were extremely popular with
investors and billions of dollars worth of limited partnership units ("Units") were
purchased by investors. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 severely limited the tax
benefits associated with real estate limited partnerships and their popularity
decreased. However, due to the massive distribution of these securities among
investors, a secondary market emerged in the late 1980's and early 1990's for those
investors wishing to sell their Units.
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The secondary market is primarily made up of: (i) secondary market firms,
which generally match buyers and sellers, and are motivated by commissions; (ii)
individual buyers and sellers, who are motivated by yield, familiarity with the general
partner and partnership, long-term values and real estate as an investment; and (iii)
institutional funds, which are motivated by many of the same factors as individuals.
However, unlike securities traded on the New York and American Stock Exchanges
and Nasdaq, there is no central quote service for limited partnership units. Instead,
it may take from several days to several weeks to receive some pricing indication,
and this may be merely a general indication and not a firm bid. Finally, an actual
sale may require several months to complete, due to the many rules applied by
general partners related to transfers of limited partnership units.

Kam, Schroeder and Smith
Several empirical studies have been conducted on real estate limited
partnerships in an attempt to quantify the discounts from net asset value ("NAV") at
which their Units trade and to identify those factors that account for the discounts.
Kam, Schroeder and Smith of Houlihan Valuation Advisors have conducted several
such studies. Their first study examined the prices of 146 different limited
partnerships in April and May of 1993. They found that the average limited
partnership's Units traded at a 38% discount to its NAV. More specifically, they
found that the average commercial real estate limited partnership's Units traded at a
57% discount to NAV. Their study also found that a key determinant of the size of
the discount was the current yield of the Units. Discounts from NAV tended to be
greatest for those partnerships where distributions were low or did not exist.
In 1994, Kam, Schroeder and Smith conducted a second and third study on
the secondary markets for limited partnerships. The second study reviewed 109
limited partnerships that traded in the secondary markets in the first half of 1994.
The third study looked at 168 limited partnerships that traded during the second half
of 1994. The second and third studies revealed average discounts from NAV for
distributing commercial real estate limited partnerships of 51.6% and 43.9%,
respectively. A distributing partnership is one making annual distributions and it
should be noted that the above discounts were found despite the median yield being
greater than 9% in each study. For all partnerships reviewed, these studies found a
high correlation between the size of the discount and the current yield as shown
below.
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These findings are consistent with financial theory. Where a partnership is
distributing all of its current earnings, one would expect lower discounts for lack of
control since the limited partners are receiving their share of the partnership's
income on a current basis. On the other hand, where a partnership is either
accumulating its current income or has none, one would expect investors to demand
large discounts from NAV to be induced to purchase their Units. The size of the
discounts demanded should reflect the uncertainty associated with the timing of any
future operating or liquidating distributions.
Kam, Schroeder and Smith concluded that the most important factors that
influence the pricing of limited partnership interests are current distributions, net
asset value, cash flow (in the form of operating surplus) and book value. They also
pointed out that private partnerships often do not enjoy professional management,
property diversification, mandatory distribution requirements or a secondary market
of any kind. Thus, they suggest that discounts from NAV for Units of a private
partnership are likely to be larger than for Units of a publicly traded partnership.

The Partnership Spectrum
The Partnership Spectrum (Spencer Jeffries, ed.) has also conducted studies
of the discounts applied to the NAV of publicly traded partnerships based on actual
partnership trades. The studies are conducted annually and include only
partnerships that have not announced any liquidation plans. The NAVs used in the
studies are at or near each calendar year end and the trading prices are from trades
occurring in April and May of the following year. The NAVs used assume the sale of
all properties at their estimated market values, the payment of all related expenses
and the liquidation of the partnership. We note that the discounts identified in The
Partnership Spectrum studies are the discounts from NAV paid by the buyer. Sellers
generally must also pay commissions and transaction costs ranging from 5% to 10%
of the transaction amount. As a result, these discounts are understated.
The Partnership Spectrum noted that the overall discounts from NAV for
publicly traded real estate partnership interests have declined during the last several
years and attributed the decline to the fact that secondary market buyers have been
factoring ever shorter anticipated holding periods into their pricing models. In fact,
many secondary market buyers are now expecting that most of these partnerships
will be liquidated in the next three to five years, even though no liquidation plans
have been announced. While secondary market buyers certainly factor current
distribution yields into their pricing models, the potential for reaping near-term capital
gains from partnership liquidations is even more appealing than quarterly
distributions. However, The Partnership Spectrum further noted that for those
partnerships that have not announced definitive liquidation plans, investors focus on
whether the partnership has the ability to pay operating distributions and the level of
debt financing utilized by the partnership. The less able the partnership is to pay
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operating distributions and the higher the level of debt financing, the higher the
discount applied to the partnership's NAV. The Partnership Spectrum also noted
that investors ascribe little value to the equity build-up within partnerships due to
debt reduction.
The 1999 study, which was based on year-end 1998 NAV data and trading
prices in April and May 1999, yielded the following results:

Number of
Partnerships

Average
Discount

Average
Yield

Equity - paying distributions,
with low or no debt

27

25%

8.8%

Equity - paying distributions,
with moderate to high debt

17

35%

6.9%

Equity - not paying
distributions

15

46%

0%

Undeveloped land

4

46%

0%

Type of Partnership

The 2002 study, using year-end 2001 NAV data and trading prices in April
and May 2002, showed that discounts had declined since 1999 for the reasons
noted above. The results of the 2002 study are shown below:

Number of
Partnerships

Average
Discount

Average
Yield

Equity - paying
distributions, with low or no
debt

18

16%

8.6%

Equity - paying
distributions, with moderate
to high debt

14

26%

6.5%

Equity - not paying
distributions

5

32%

0%

Undeveloped land

3

35%

0%

Type of Partnership

It should be noted that the aforementioned partnership studies dealt with partnership
interests that were traded on a secondary market. Accordingly, some analysts
believe that the discounts found in these studies were attributable solely to the lack
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of control inherent in limited partnership interests. However, most practitioners
believe that discounts from NAV found in these partnership studies include at least
some discount related to liquidity due to the relative inefficiency of the secondary
market for public partnership interests and the time required to complete trades.
Accordingly, the discounts found in these partnership studies may slightly overstate
the size of the discount for lack of control.
We note that discounts for private limited partnerships and limited liability companies
are generally much larger than discounts for publicly traded limited partnerships.
Investors in private limited partnerships and limited liability companies demand
higher returns on their investments than investors in publicly traded limited
partnerships due to various factors, including the lack of: (i) professional
management; (ii) asset diversification; (iii) mandatory distribution requirements; (iv) a
secondary market; and/or (v) SEC registration and public oversight.

Closed-End Investment Companies
Closed-end investment companies are often used as a proxy to estimate the
minority interest discount applicable to a private or family-owned investment
company. A closed-end investment company is a publicly traded investment
company. It raises funds from the public and uses the funds to invest in securities.
Domestic closed-end investment companies generally trade on the New York or
American Stock Exchange. Because closed-end investment companies have a
fixed number of shares outstanding, the price at which its shares trade may be at a
premium or discount to their underlying NAV.
Most closed-end investment companies trade at discounts to their NAV. The
discount is generally thought to be a function of one or more of the following factors:
(i) built-in taxes related to appreciated securities in the fund; (ii) the annual fees and
expenses charged by the manager of the fund; and/or (iii) the lack of control
discount associated with the inability of a minority shareholder to cause the fund to
be liquidated, alter its investment strategy or otherwise control management of the
fund. Shareholders of closely held investment companies are also subject to these
discount-generating factors, and often to a much greater degree.
Because closed-end investment companies are traded actively on established
exchanges, none of the discount to NAV at which they trade is related to lack of
marketability. Furthermore, because closed-end investment companies are highly
regulated, the lack of control discount for a closed-end investment company is
expected to be substantially lower than the discount for a similar family-owned
investment company. Clearly, the minority shareholder's lack of control should be
less important to the shareholder of a regulated and publicly traded investment
company than to the shareholder of a non-regulated private investment company.
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Exhibit D
Stranqi v. Commissioner Remand Summary
T.C. Memo 2003-145 (May 20, 2003)

CASE HISTORY. The initial Tax Court decision held that the partnership
would be respected for tax purposes despite non-tax motives for its
creation, rejected any "gift on creation" for gift tax purposes, held that
sections 2073 and 2704 did not apply, and determined the amount of
discounts. 115 T.C. 478. The initial decision refused to allow the IRS to
pursue a claim under section 2036 on procedural grounds. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Tax Court's rulings on the
substantive issues but reversed on the procedural issue, and remanded
the case for the Tax Court to consider the section 2036 claims by the
IRS. 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002). This is the consideration of the
Section 2036 issue on remand by the Tax Court. This is a memo
decision by Judge Cohen, and is not a decision reviewed by the full Tax
Court.
FACTS EMPHASIZED BY COURT
A. 98% of decedent's wealth was contributed to partnership and
corporation.
B. 99% limited partnership interest was retained by decedent.
C. 1% general partner was new corporation owned 47% by decedent
and 53% by decedent's children. (Children subsequently gave 1% to
a Foundation.)
D. Corporation entered management agreement with decedent's son-inlaw (who was also decedent's attorney-in-fact under a power of
attorney) to manage day-to-day business of the corporation and
partnership-which the court interpreted to include making all
distribution decisions.
E. Partnership agreement provided that income, after deducting certain
listed expenses "shall be distributed at such times and in such
amounts as the Managing General Partner, in its sole discretion, shall
determine, taking into account the reasonable business needs of the
Partnership (including plan for expansion of the Partnership's
business)."
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F. Various distributions were made to or for decedent or decedent's
estate (including home health care, medical expenses of health care
provider, funeral expenses, estate administration expenses, debts of
decedent, specific bequest, and estate and inheritance taxes).
Ill.

HOLDINGS
A. Section 2036(a)(1). Section 2036(a)(1) applies to the corporation and
partnership created by decedent.
1. Circumstances that generally suggest an implicit retained
interest under §2036(a)(1) include: "transfer of the majority of
the decedent's assets, continued occupation of transferred
property, commingling of personal and entity assets,
disproportionate distributions, use of entity funds for personal
expenses, and testamentary characteristics of the
arrangement."
2. Formalities recognizing the entity were followed ("the proverbial
'i's were dotted' and 't's were crossed'.")
3. Facts in this case indicating implicit retention of economic
benefit:
a. Decedent contributed 98% of his wealth, including his
residence. The fact that decedent possessed
"liquefiable" assets to cover decedent's anticipated living
needs over his short life expectancy did not matter. The
relative dearth of liquefied as opposed to "liquefiable"
assets reflect that the partnership and corporation would
be the primary source of decedent's liquidity.
b. The decedent continued physical possession of his
residence. The partnership charged rent to the
decedent, but the court observed that the fact that the
rent was merely accrued and not actually paid until over
2 years after decedent's death reflects that the rent was
not arm's length. The court concluded that "accounting
entries alone are of small moment in belying the
existence of an agreement for retained possession and
enjoyment."
c. While pro rata distributions were made to all partners,
because interests held by others are de minimis, "a pro
rata payment is hardly more than a token in nature."
d. Actual distributions reflect "a conclusion that those
involved understood that the decedent's assets would
be made available as needs materialized."
-49-

e. The partnership/corporation arrangement has more
testamentary characteristics than a joint investment
vehicle for management of assets. Factors supporting
this conclusion include the unilateral nature of the
formation, the fact that contributed property included the
majority of decedent's assets, and the decedent's
advanced age and serious health condition.
f. "[T]he crucial characteristic is that virtually nothing
beyond formal title changed in decedent's relationship to
his assets." The children did not have a meaningful
economic stake in the property during decedent's life
and made no objections or concerns when large sums
were advanced to decedent or his estate.
B. Section 2036(a)(2). Section 2036(a)(2) applies to transfers to the
corporation and partnership.
1. Factors Causing 2036(a)(2) Inclusion. The court analyzed in
detail the facts of this case compared to the Byrum case.
a. Problematic Retained Powers. Decedent retained legally
enforceable rights to designate who shall enjoy property
and income from the partnership and corporation. The
court emphasized that it is immaterial whether the
documents and relationships create rights exercisable
by decedent alone or in conjunction with other corporate
shareholders and the corporation's president.
i.
Partnership income-the agreement gave the
general partner "sole discretion to determine
distributions."
ii.
Partnership property-decedent can act
together with the other shareholders to dissolve
the partnership. (Under the partnership
agreement, the partnership is dissolved by
unanimous vote of limited partners and general
partner. Under the corporation's bylaws, all of the
corporation's shareholders must consent to
dissolution of the partnership. Thus, decedent
could act in his capacity as a limited partner and
shareholder with the other owners to dissolve the
partnership.)
iii.
Corporation property and income-decedent
"held the right, in conjunction with one or more
other Stranco directors, to declare dividends."
iv.
"Banding together" is sufficient. Taxpayers
argued that if the mere fact that a decedent "could
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band together with all of the other shareholders of
a corporation" is sufficient to cause inclusion
under section 2036(a)(2), the Supreme Court
could not have reached its decision in Byrum.
The court responded with an analysis of the
additional constraints in Byrum that are not
present in this case.
2. Comparison to Byrum. Additional constraints upon rights to
designate in Byrum that are not present in this case:
a. Independent Trustee. In Byrum, the decedent retained
the right to vote stock, which could be used to elect
directors, who decided what distributions would be made
from the corporation. However, the stock was given to a
trust with an independent trustee who had the sole
authority to pay or withhold income. In this case,
distribution decisions were made by the corporation. The
decedent owned 47% of the stock and was the largest
shareholder. All decisions were ultimately made by
decedent's attorney-in-fact as the manager of the
corporation and partnership. (OBSERVATION: In
Byrum, a 2-step process was required to make
distributions. First, the corporation had to distribute cash
to the trust (and this decision was, under the court's
analysis, made in connection with the decedent).
Second, the independent trustee could decide to make
distributions to beneficiaries. What if a partnership
agreement provided a 2-step process to make
distributions and the decedent could not participate at all
in one of those 2 steps? If that would cause a different
result, is it really important that there was a second step
in Byrum that could only be exercised by an
independent trustee?) (Would there have been a
different result if the limited partnership interests had
been given to a trust with an independent trustee who
made distribution decisions?)
b. Economic and Business Realities. The flow of funds in
Byrum was dependent on economic and business
realities of small operating enterprises which impact the
earnings and dividends. "These complexities do not
apply to [the partnership or corporation], which held only
monetary or investment assets."
c. Fiduciary Duties. Fiduciary duties in Byrum were
distinguished because there were unrelated minority
shareholders who could enforce these duties by suit.
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"The rights to designate traceable to decedent through
[the corporation] cannot be characterized as limited in
any meaningful way by duties owed essentially to
himself. Nor do the obligations of [the corporation's]
directors to the corporation itself warrant any different
conclusion. Decedent held 47 percent of [the
corporation], and his own children held 52 of the
remaining 53%. Intrafamily fiduciary duties within an
investment vehicle simply are not equivalent in nature to
the obligations created by the United States v. Byrum,
supra, scenario." The fact that there was a 1%
shareholder of the corporation was "no more than
window dressing." "A charity given a gratuitous 1percent interest would not realistically exercise any
meaningful oversight." (OBSERVATION: The IRS
made the argument that fiduciary duties negate the
application of section 2036 only if there are unrelated
parties to enforce the duties in Letter Ruling 8038014.
Holding that fiduciary duties provide a limit on the right to
designate who enjoys or possesses transferred property
only if there are unrelated persons who can enforce
those duties seems inconsistent with many cases that
have held that very broad administrative powers retained
by a donor as trustee do not invoke section 2036,
primarily because of the restriction imposed by the
fiduciary duties. Those cases involve trust transactions
that do not involve any unrelated parties. E
Old
Colony Trust Co. v. U.S., 423 F.2d 601, 603 (lsT'Cir.
1970)(broad trustee administrative powers that could
"very substantially shift the economic benefits of the
trust" did not invoke section 2036(a)(2) because such
powers were exercisable by the donor-trustee in the best
interests of the trust and beneficiaries, and were subject
to court review).)
C. Bona Fide Consideration Exception. The bona fide consideration
exception under Section 2036 does not apply.
1. Stran-qi and two previous Tax Court memorandum decisions
(as well as a decision of the federal district court of North
Texas) have interpreted this exception in a partnership context
as having two requirements. (See Estate of Thompson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-246; Estate of Harper v
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121; Kimbell v. U.S., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 700 (N.D. Tex. 2003.) The court stated that this
exception under section 2036 has two requirements: (1) A
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bona fide sale, meaning an arm's length transaction, and (2)
adequate and full consideration.
a. No bona fide arm's length transaction occurred. The
decedent's attorney-in-fact prepared all documents
without any meaningful negotiation or bargaining with
other interest-holders.
b. Full and adequate consideration does not exist where
there is a mere "recycling" of value through partnership
or corporate solution. "Without any change whatsoever
in the underlying pool of assets or prospect for profit, as,
for example, where others make contributions of
property or services in the interest of true joint ownership
or enterprise, there exists nothing but a circuitous
'recycling' of value." Decedent contributed more than
99% of the total property and received back an interest
"the value of which derived almost exclusively from the
assets he had just assigned." (OBSERVATION: This
analysis suggests the wisdom of having parties other
than the decedent contribute substantial assets to the
partnership.) The court distinguished the Church case,
which was affirmed by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals
(which will hear the appeal of this case), because
Church involved "contributions by other participants not
de minimis in nature."
D. Effect of Applying Section 2036. The effect of applying section 2036 in
the context of creation of the corporation and partnership is that 99%
of the asset value of the partnership and 47% of the asset value of the
corporation are included in decedent's estate. (These percentages
are the same as decedent's ownership of the entities.) In effect, the
existence of the partnership and corporation was ignored for estate
tax purposes.
IV.

PLANNING IMPLICATIONS
A. Memo Decision. This is a memorandum decision, rather than a
decision of the full Tax Court. That's interesting because the analysis
under section 2036(a)(2) is novel and potentially far-reaching.
However, it has not been reviewed by the full Tax Court.
B. Appeal to 5 th Circuit. The IRS obtained all relief that it had been
seeking in its notice of deficiency. There seems little doubt that the
estate will appeal this decision to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals.
The 5th Circuit previously rejected a section 2036(a)(1) and
2036(a)(2) claim by the IRS on a partnership with a less than perfect
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fact situation in Church v. U.S., 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir.
2001 )(unpublished opinion).

C. Section 2036(a)(1) Issues.
1. Formalities Not Enough. Observing formalities was not
sufficient to avoid section 2036(a)(1). (Many of the prior
section 2036(a)(1) cases involved the failure to observe
corporate and partnership formalities. E
Estate of Reichardt
v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144 (2000); Estate of
Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-242.)
2. Retain Assets for Living Expenses. Retain sufficient liquid (not
just "liquefiable") assets outside the partnership to provide
anticipated living expenses.
3. Residence. Do not transfer residence to partnership.
4. Rentals. If taxpayer uses partnership assets, pay fair market
value rental in an arm's length manner. Actually pay rent and
do not just accrue rentals.
5. Decisions Based on Personal Needs. The purpose of
distributions should be based on business reasons of the
partnership and not on personal desires of the taxpayer to
cover personal cash needs.
6. Contributions by Others. Having significant contributions by
others helps. Making pro rata distributions to multiple partners
does not appear so much that taxpayer implicitly retained the
ability to access partnership assets whenever desired.
Avoiding a unilateral creation and seeking input from others
about structural issues helps avoid a "testamentary"
appearance.
D. Section 2036(a)(2) Issues.
1. Dictum? Is all of the discussion about section 2036(a)(2)
technically dictum, because the holding for the IRS under
section 2036(a)(1) gave the IRS all of the relief that it
requested? In the words of the court, "We address these
arguments as an alternative to our conclusions concerning
section 2036(a)(1 )."
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2. Sole Discretion Over Cash Distributions. Perhaps critical to the
court's analysis is that the partnership agreement gave the
managing partner "sole discretion" over distributing income in
excess of business needs rather than mandating distributions
of all cash in excess of business needs. (Structuring the
partnership agreement to mandate distribution of "excess
cash" would help with respect to retained powers over income,
but would not seem to help rebut an argument over the
retained powers to liquidate and distribute the entire assets of
the entity "in connection with" the other owners.)
3. Narrow Interpretation of Byrum. The court interpreted Byrum
very narrowly. In particular, it rejects a "fiduciary duty" analysis
that renders section 2036(a)(2) inapplicable if retained
administrative powers that impact distributions are held in a
fiduciary capacity. The court views Byrum as being limited by
special constraints on the donor's retained rights in that case,
including (i) an independent trustee ultimately made distribution
decisions, (ii) cash flow from the small operating enterprise in
Byrum was subject to economic and business realities that do
not apply to an investment partnership, and (iii) there were
unrelated parties in Byrum (beyond just a de minimis 1%
interest) who give rise to a realistic possibility for enforcement
of fiduciary duties. That interpretation is far more restrictive
than the IRS's published position on Byrum in Rev. Rul. 81-15,
1981-1 C.B. 457. (Interestingly, the court cites the IRS's
unpublished rulings interpreting Byrum with respect to
partnerships [PLRs 9415007, 9310039, & TAM 9136006] and
discounts those rulings as having no precedential force, but
does not cite the IRS's published position interpreting the
fiduciary duty analysis in Byrum.)
4. "In Connection With" Broad Application. The court, perhaps to
a larger extent than any previous section 2036(a)(2) case,
interpreted the "in connection with" language in the statute and
regulations very broadly. The court's analysis, when pushed to
its extreme, would mean that any family entity could be ignored
under section 2036(a)(2) because the decedent-regardless
how small of an interest that the decedent held-would hold
the power, "in connection with others" to vote its interest as a
member of the entity (i) to affect indirectly when income
distributions would be made, and (ii) to liquidate the entity and
distribute its assets. An extension of this analysis could
ultimately lead to negating any fractionalization discounts
where the other interests in an asset are held by family

members. (For example, the taxpayer could act "in connection
with" other family owners to sell the asset, thus avoiding or
minimizing any minority or marketability discounts. This is
basically yields the result-under section 2036 rather than
under a valuation approach-that the Treasury Department has
pushed in several different legislative sessions, but that has, so
far, been rejected by Congress.) It seems very doubtful that
courts will extend the application of section 2036 in this manner
to negate fractionalization discounts.
5. Planning Structure of General Partner. In light of the court's "in
connection with" analysis, the most conservative structure to
avoid section 2036(a)(2) would be for the taxpayer to own no
interest in the general partner. (However, even that structure
would not be immune from attack, under the court's reasoning,
if the partnership can be liquidated with the consent of all
partners; the decedent could then act "in connection with" other
owners to liquidate the entity at any time and regain
possession of his proportionate part of the assets in the entity.)
Furthermore, if another individual serves as general partner, be
wary of giving that individual a general power of attorney. The
court gave little weight to fiduciary duties that the son-in-law
held as manager of the partnership and corporation because
he stood in a preexisting confidential relationship and owed
fiduciary duties to decedent personally as his attorney in fact.
E. Consideration Exception to Section 2036.
1. Statutory Exception. Section 2036(a)(1) or (a)(2) only applies if
the decedent has "made a transfer (except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth)."
2. Two-Step Analysis.
a. The first requirement is that there is a bona fide sale,
meaning an arm's length transaction. Having other
partners (even family members) and having negotiations
in the structure decisions would help meet this
requirement.
b. The second requirement is that there is "full and
adequate consideration." The court holds that the
receipt by the donor of limited partnership interests in
return for the transfer of assets to the partnership is not
"adequate and full consideration" even though the Tax
Court has held on various occasions (including the initial
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Stranqi decision) that the creation of the partnership
does not result in a "gift on creation" for gift tax
purposes. The court reasons that "full and adequate
consideration" does not exist where there is merely a
"recycling" of value through partnership or corporate
solution. The court cited its explanation in Harper that
there is a mere "recycling" where there is no change
whatsoever "in the underlying pool of assets or prospect
for profit, as, for example, where others make
contributions of property or services in the interest of
true joint ownership or enterprise." Thus, having other
partners who make contributions to the "underlying pool
of assets" would help in arguing that the full
consideration exception applies.

Exhibit E

Listing of Factors Impacting Lack Of Control And Marketability For FLPs
No single formula or approach will effectively estimate the discount from
net asset value that appropriately reflects the impairment of value resulting from
a minority interest's lack of control and marketability. Each situation is unique
and many factors must be considered prior to making final judgment. The chart
below summarizes eleven key factors that we consider in determining discounts
for lack of control and marketability for each FLP interest. This chart also
summarizes the expected interaction between each factor and the size of the
discount. For example, the valuation discount would tend to be lower for a
minority owner that has strong withdrawal and distribution rights, as opposed to
one that does not, because these rights provide such owner with enhanced
elements of control and liquidity.
Return Expectations
Distribution history and expectations
Expected capital appreciation
Probable holding period
Recent performance

Reduces Discount
Higher distributions
Higher appreciation
Shorter period
Strong performance

Increases Discount
Lower distributions
Lower appreciation
Longer period
Weak performance

Risk Profile-Entity Level
Financial risk (i.e., leverage)
Business risk (esp. diversification)
Liquidity of underlying assets

Lower leverage
Lower risk
Greater liquidity

Higher leverage
Higher risk
Less liquidity

Risk Profile - Ownership Level
Attributes of control
Distribution and withdrawal rights
Restrictions on transfer
History of prior sales

More control
Greater rights
More restrictive
Established history

Less control
Less rights
Less restrictive
No history

